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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy courts and other federal courts in bankruptcy' wield
considerable power in our society. In addition to deciding a substan-
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the firm of McKee Nelson LLP and also serve as a consultant or expert witness for
other firms on bankruptcy and commercial law transactions and litigation for
compensation.
1 The term "federal courts in bankruptcy" as used in this Article refers to (1) all
Bankruptcy Courts (including Bankruptcy Appellate Panels) and (2) United States
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tial volume of commercial and business law disputes,2 they play a sig-
nificant role in mass tort litigation, 3 environmental litigation, 4 and
other noncommercial litigation.5 More significantly, their influence
extends well beyond litigation. Their pronouncements influence how
the parties to a myriad of business transactions, aggregating trillions
of dollars, structure and price those transactions in light of the costs
that bankruptcy law creates. Indeed, the entire securitization indus-
try, involving more than six trillion dollars of outstanding securities,
developed in the last twenty years as a response to the costs that bank-
ruptcy law imposes on traditional secured creditors. 6
District Courts, United States Courts of Appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court when they are deciding bankruptcy law issues.
2 See, e.g., NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
722 & n.1739 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. For the fiscal year ending Septem-
ber 30, 2002, there were 39,091 business bankruptcy filings, and 1,508,578 nonbusi-
ness bankruptcy filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 27 tbl.6,
263 tbl.F-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html. During this
period, over 73,900 adversary proceedings were filed in bankruptcy court. Id. at
28-29, 266 tbl.F-8. During this time, the following cases were filed in the district
courts: 56,824 diversity jurisdiction cases, of which approximately 26,300 were con-
tract actions and real property actions; approximately 7400 private federal question
cases consisting of contract and real property actions; and approximately 10,000 con-
tract and real property actions involving the United States as a party. Id. at 129 tbl.C-
2.
3 As of the end of 2002, over sixty companies had filed for bankruptcy to deal
with the liabilities arising out of the manufacture and sale of asbestos. See Insurance
Study Examines Cost of Asbestos Litigation, 40 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 2 (Dec. 17, 2002),
available at Westlaw, 40 No. 12 BCD (LRP) 2 (noting that asbestos litigation has led
sixty-one companies to file for bankruptcy); Next Wave of Asbestos Filings will Stretch on
as Companies Buckle Under Weight, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 1, (June 18, 2002), availa-
ble at Westlaw, 39 No. 15 BCD (LRP) 1 (asserting that the approximately 200,000
estimated pending asbestos injury cases and the expected liability of United States
companies of $200 billion "virtually assures that many companies will be seeking
Chapter 11 protection").
4 See generally KATHRYN R. HEIDT, ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
(2002).
5 See, e.g., Nancy A. Peterman et al., American Bankruptcy Institute: The Healthcare
Industry Bankruptcy Workouts Forum, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5 (2000) (discussing the
financial difficulties in the health care industry and noting the effect of the bank-
ruptcy of health care providers on patients and the community); see also FCC v.
NextWave Pers. Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 307 (2003) (holding that, under
the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Communications Commission "is not to revoke a
bankruptcy debtor's [broadband personal communications service] license solely be-
cause of a failure" to make purchase price installment payments); infra note 12.
6 For example, the total debt of issuers of asset backed securities, which are se-
curities backed by non-mortgage business and consumer loans acquired by issuers
from originators of the loans, equaled $2.4 trillion as of the end of 2002. See Domestic
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This influence extends well beyond federal law. Although the
Bankruptcy Code (Code)7 is a comprehensive federal statute, it essen-
tially establishes a method for adjusting the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and his, her, or its creditors." The underlying
debtor-creditor relationship exists under nonbankruptcy law, and the
Bankruptcy Code itself recognizes this reality. The Code contains
more than fifty references to "applicable law," "nonbankruptcy law,"
"state law," "local law," "common law," other federal law, a specific
type of law, and even the "law merchant."9 In addition, the definitions
of the two most important concepts in the Bankruptcy Code-"prop-
erty of the estate"'1 and "creditor"' '-depend on nonbankruptcy law.
Financial Statistics, 89 FED. RESERVE BULL. A4, A38 /.47 (Oct. 2003). In addition, as of
the end of 2002, about $8.5 trillion of single family and commercial mortgage loans
had been originated and remained outstanding, of which about $4.2 trillion had been
securitized. Id. at A33 l1. 1 & 53. Securitization has become important because it
avoids the costs imposed on secured credit by the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Thomas
E. Plank, Bankruptcy Professionals, Debtor Dominance, and the Future of Bankruptcy: A Re-
view and a Rhapsody on a Theme, 18 BANIK. DEv. J. 337 (2002) (reviewing DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001), and
describing the unsuccessful attack by pro-debtor interests on securitization and the
unsuccessful efforts of the securitization industry to exempt securitizations from the
Bankruptcy Code); Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Secur-
ity, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author) (argu-
ing that the legal foundations of securitization are strong and that its importance in
lowering costs for businesses and consumers ensures its long-term viability).
7 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000) (enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549).
8 The Bankruptcy Code provides for the repayment, to the extent possible, of
the debtor's debts either from the liquidation of the debtor's assets and distribution
of the net proceeds to creditors or pursuant to a reorganization plan accepted by the
creditors or approved by the bankruptcy court.
9 See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063,
1070-72 & nn.30-35 (2002) (citing the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1):
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case.
Id. The language in clause (1), of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property," is the most significant element of the definition. The other parts of the
definition refer to community property, id. § 541 (a) (2), and to property added to the
estate after the commencement of the case, id. § 541(a) (3)-(7). The term "property
of the estate" pervades the Bankruptcy Code. See Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Bounda-
ries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY LJ. 1193 (1998).
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Although some nonbankruptcy law is federal law,1 2 the overwhelming
body of nonbankruptcy law is state law. For this reason, federal courts
in bankruptcy play a significant role-perhaps the most significant of
all federal courts-in adjudicating state law issues. The way federal
courts in bankruptcy adjudicate these state law issues seriously affects
the ultimate allocation of power between states and the federal
government.
The role of federal courts in bankruptcy in deciding state law is-
sues raises the question of what constrains the federal courts in bank-
ruptcy. An obvious constraint, of course, is the Bankruptcy Code
itself. To the extent that the Code refers either expressly or implicitly
to state law, federal courts in bankruptcy must, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, discern and apply state law.
Nevertheless, despite the comprehensive coverage of the Code,
many issues arise in bankruptcy for which the Code does not provide a
clear answer. In these instances, federal courts in bankruptcy are
bound by the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins13 that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Consti-
tution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State .... There is no general federal common law." 14
11 A "creditor" is an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10). A
"claim" means a
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equita-
ble remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
Id. § 101(5).
12 See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1992) (holding that the
anti-alienation requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1), were applicable nonbankruptcy law for purposes of § 541(c) (2)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a restriction on the transfer of a benefi-
cial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law is enforceable in a bankruptcy case); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S.
513, 523, 526-27, 531-34 (1984) (reconciling a conflict between the Code and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), and holding that (1) § 365
of the Code authorized the debtor in possession to reject a labor agreement without
complying with the procedural requirements of the NLRA, and (2) the debtor's fail-
ure to comply with the collective bargaining agreement during the bankruptcy case
was not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA).
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 Id. at 78.
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This statement encompasses several distinct ideas. 15 One idea is
the absolute limit on federal judicial power grounded in the federal-
ism of the Constitution: If Congress does not have the power under
Article I of the Constitution to prescribe a rule to be applied in a
particular controversy, 16 then federal judges may not prescribe a fed-
eral rule and must apply state law. 17 How this aspect of Erie, which I
call the primary Erie doctrine, applies to bankruptcy is the focus of this
Article.
A more prominent, ambiguous, and difficult aspect of Erie ad-
dresses the separation of judicial and legislative powers and the
proper role of the federal judiciary: If Congress has the power to pre-
scribe a rule to be applied in a particular controversy but has not done
so (and the Constitution is also silent), then, in the absence of an
important and discernible federal interest, federal judges should ap-
ply state law and not prescribe a federal rule.18
The following diagram illustrates the different aspects of Erie.
15 See generally PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 12-13 (4th ed. 1998) (describing two different
views of Erie); 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 4504-4505, at 26-73 (1996) (noting the different meanings of the Erie doctrine);
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARTv. L. REv. 693 (1974) (arguing that
there is no single Erie doctrine and describing three different standards for applying
Erie).
16 Although the focus of the inquiry here is Congress's powers under Article I,
the United States may also exercise power under other articles of the Constitution,
and federal courts may therefore exercise appropriate jurisdiction under those arti-
cles consistent with the Erie doctrine.
17 See infra Part I.A. Some have questioned whether Erie stands for this view and
have asserted that federal courts may create federal common law in areas beyond
Congress's Article I powers. See, e.g., PartrickJ. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Juris-
diction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L.
REv. 79, 118 (1993) (stating, in the context of diversity jurisdiction, that "[t]here is
nothing absurd or implausible in having the federal courts fashion and apply com-
mon-law rules in areas in which congressional power does not reach"). I would disa-
gree with this view as it applies to bankruptcy. Borchers cites federal courts' exercise
of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III, id., but there is nothing in the Constitution
to empower federal courts to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over matters that fall
outside of admiralty and other federal powers.
18 See infra Part I.C.
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State Law Domain
Current State Law but Potential Federal Law
Domain
Currenat Federal Law Domain
If the entire box represents the universe of American legal issues,
the top, clear portion represents that domain where federal law may
not intrude under the Constitution, an admittedly small portion.1 9
The middle, light-gray portion represents the domain where federal
law could operate but currently does not, and the bottom, darker-gray
portion represents the domain where federal law currently operates.
Under the primary Erie doctrine, federal courts may not enter the
clear box, the State Law Domain. In the context of federal diversity
jurisdiction, this proposition seems unremarkable. 20 Almost all of the
controversy over the Erie doctrine centers on the separation of powers
aspect of Erie- When can federal courts enter the middle area, the
light-gray domain? The controversy arises because of the difficulties
in determining when to apply a state rule in light of a potentially ap-
plicable federal statute or policy.21
Without citing Erie, federal courts in bankruptcy have applied the
separation of powers aspect of Erie. Specifically, the Supreme Court
stated in Butner v. United States,22 and reiterated in Raleigh v. Illinois
Department of Revenue,23 that federal courts in bankruptcy should fol-
low state law if federal policy does not require a different result.24
Many courts have cited Butner for the proposition that federal courts
19 See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 15, at 704 (refuting the argument that there is no
constitutional basis for Erie and noting that "the Constitution's utility as a point of
reference was ended" by the primary Erie doctrine's "point having been made").
21 See, e.g., 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 4504-4505, 4508-4517, at 26-73,
220-559 (examining the difficulties of appiying Erie); Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doc-
trine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1235 (1999) (suggesting an analytical model for the Erie doctrine that weighs the
relative strengths of the federal and state interests to determine when to apply a fed-
eral rule); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 881 (1986) (arguing that the permissible scope of federal common law is
broader than previously thought, and analyzing the way federal judges have used their
discretion to create federal common law).
22 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); see also infra notes 73-76, 79-81, 193 and accompany-
ing text.
23 530 U.S. 15 (2000); see also infra notes 77, 196 and accompanying text.
24 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also infra text accompanying note 76 (quoting the
Court's statement, which is known as the "Butner principle").
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in bankruptcy should look to state law.25 The Butner principle, how-
ever, suggests that federal courts in bankruptcy need not follow state
law if federal bankruptcy policy requires a different result.2 6 And fed-
eral courts in bankruptcy have created federal bankruptcy rules that
override state law entitlements when they thought such rules neces-
sary to further some bankruptcy policy.27
Just as federal courts in diversity cases have had difficulty applying
the separation of powers Erie doctrine,28 federal courts in bankruptcy
have not developed any consistent theory on when they may overrule
state law. This lack of a consistent theory, however, is not the most
serious shortcoming in how federal courts in bankruptcy address state
law issues. The most significant shortcoming is the failure to recog-
nize that, for some state law issues, federal courts in bankruptcy do
not have the power under the Constitution to override state law re-
gardless of what "bankruptcy policy" might suggest. In other words,
the "federal policy" exception in Butner's explication of the separation
of powers aspect of Erie fails to respect the primary Erie doctrine. The
purpose of this Article is to demonstrate how federal courts in bank-
ruptcy must comply with the primary Erie doctrine.
Congress has enacted the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to one of its
enumerated powers under the U.S. Constitution, the power to enact
laws "on the subject of Bankruptcies." 29 Congress is bound by the lim-
itation of this grant of power.30 Therefore, federal courts in bank-
ruptcy are bound by the limitation on federal power inherent in
Congress's Bankruptcy Power. Notwithstanding the federal policy ex-
ception of Butner, federal courts may not create federal common law
and must find and follow state law when confronted with a legal issue
that is beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause.31 In such cases,
they may not disregard state law even if they think that "bankruptcy
policy" requires a different result. As discussed in Part L.A below, they
must adhere to the primary Erie doctrine.
25 See, e.g., In re Kenneth Allen Knight Trust, 303 F.3d 671, 678-79 (6th Cir.
2002); In re Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Universal Seismic As-
socs., Inc., 288 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Crystal Props., Ltd., 268 F.3d 743,
749 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 2000).
26 See, e.g., infra note 118 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 66, 71, 159-71 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 15, 21.
29 Clause 4, Section 8 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to
"establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
30 See generally Plank, supra note 9.
31 If the nonbankruptcy issues depend on federal law other than bankruptcy law,
then courts are similarly bound by the federal nonbankruptcy law.
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Elsewhere, I have developed my own view of the limits of Con-
gress's Bankruptcy Power.32 I describe my views in Part I.B below.
The applicability of Erie in bankruptcy, however, does not depend on
my view or any other view of the particular limits of bankruptcy. As
long as there is some limit on Congress's power under the Bankruptcy
Clause, federal courts will similarly be limited by Article I of the Con-
stitution and the primary Erie doctrine.
Requiring federal courts in bankruptcy to apply the state law for
nonbankruptcy law issues is necessary to honor our federal system of
government. In holding that the Commerce Clause 33 does not au-
thorize Congress to ban weapons from schools in United States v. Lo-
pez34-the first time in fifty years that the Court recognized a limit on
the Commerce Clause 35-the Supreme Court emphasized that, yes,
the federal government is a government of limited powers. 36 The
Court has also honored the limitation on the federal judicial power
against the states expressed in the Eleventh Amendment, 37 and the
limitation on congressional ability to impose obligations on the
states.3 8 Bankruptcy law should not be exempt from a robust recogni-
tion of a meaningful allocation of powers between federal and state
32 See Plank, supra note 9, at 1089-95.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
35 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism:
Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1220
(2003).
36 See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (holding that
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not permit Congress to enact the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act).
37 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002)
(holding that state sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Commission
from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port had violated the
Shipping Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress
could not subject the state to suit by state probation officers for violation of overtime
provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, in state court without the state's consent); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999)
(holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, authorized Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked authority under the Indian
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act).
38 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating on Tenth
Amendment grounds certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, requiring state officials to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers).
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institutions. Therefore, as described in detail in Parts I through IV,
when a federal court in bankruptcy must decide an issue that is be-
yond the constitutional scope of bankruptcy law, all the force of the
primary Erie doctrine applies, and the "federal policy" exception in
Butner may not apply.
To be sure, federal courts have faced difficulties in applying Erie
in diversity cases. 39 These difficulties also arise in bankruptcy. Fur-
ther complicating the application of the Erie doctrine in bankruptcy is
the different procedural process of bankruptcy law. The issues that
arise in a diversity case are often similar to those that arise in a state
court case because federal diversity cases are parallel to state court
cases. This parallel structure does not exist in bankruptcy. The
mandatory state law issues that bankruptcy courts must address in
bankruptcy cases usually do not arise in state law courts in the same
way, because states do not have comparable bankruptcy statutes.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part V, respecting Erie in bankruptcy
will produce more analytically sound results. State law is the primary
source for defining contract and property rights. To adjust the rela-
tionship between an insolvent debtor and the debtor's creditors-the
province of bankruptcy law-federal courts in bankruptcy must de-
cide fundamental questions of state law. When these fundamental
questions have not been decided by state legislatures or state courts, a
federal court in bankruptcy must look broadly and deeply into all as-
pects of state law to resolve the issue. No longer may federal courts in
bankruptcy slight a state law analysis on difficult issues by falling back
on "federal law" or "bankruptcy policy." 40 Instead, the federal court
must decide these fundamental state law questions as if the federal
court were a state court applying the Bankruptcy Code, and as if the
Code were a state bankruptcy law.
Honoring Erie in this way produces an irony. Except in those in-
stances when states have chosen to follow different rules,4 1 the rea-
soned determination of fundamental state law questions by federal
courts in bankruptcy will produce a cumulative body of state law analy-
39 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism
and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 passim (1997) (describing
several current approaches to finding state law and arguing that the federal courts
should employ a presumption in favor of certifying unresolved issues to state courts).
40 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
41 For example, about thirty states recognize the tenancy by the entirety. See 7
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01 [3], at 52-4 to 52-12 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2003)
(surveying the laws in fifty states and the District of Columbia); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK
& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 195-97 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
the limitations on the individual tenant's rights).
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sis that will begin to resemble an American general commercial law.
The American general commercial law, developed by following Erie in
bankruptcy will partially resurrect the vision of a general commercial
law that Justice Story articulated more than 150 years ago in Swift v.
Tyson 42-the case that Erie overruled.
I. ERIE'S CONSTRAINT ON BANKRUPTCY
Although the Bankruptcy Code implicitly and expressly relies on
state law to a substantial degree, 43 applying state law in bankruptcy law
involves more than statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 44 at the very least, requires federal courts
in bankruptcy facing state law outside the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause to find and to apply state statutory or common law.
A. The Primary Erie Doctrine
In 1938, the Supreme Court in Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson45 and
held that, in a diversity case, there is no federal general common law.
Tompkins had sued the Erie Railroad Co. in the New York federal
district court for injuries suffered in Pennsylvania, and sought to use a
federal common law of torts to obtain relief that would not have been
available under Pennsylvania law. 46 Tompkins obtained ajury verdict
for his injuries on the basis of the federal rule. Reversing, the Court
declared: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.... There is no federal general common law." 47
42 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see also infra note 45.
43 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
44 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45 Swift held, as a matter of statutory construction and not as a matter of constitu-
tional power, that the Rules of Decision Act, part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 20, 1 Stat. 73, requiring federal courts to follow state laws, did not apply to state
common law. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19. Accordingly, the Court relied on
general principles of commercial law to hold that a transferee, who took an instru-
ment in satisfaction of an antecedent debt, gave sufficient "value" to be a holder in
due course, and who took free of the personal defenses of the obligor on the instru-
ment. Id. at 18-22.
46 Tompkins was injured by an object protruding from a moving rail car while he
was walking on a commonly used footpath alongside the railroad's right of way in
Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania law, Tompkins would be considered a trespasser
and therefore not entitled to recover absent the railroad's gross negligence. See Erie,
304 U.S. at 69-70. The federal common law rule provided that Tompkins was a licen-
see to whom the railroad owed a duty of care. Id. at 70.
47 Id. at 78.
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By the time Erie was decided, Swift had received much criticism.
Criticisms noted by the Court in Erie included assertions that Swift was
incorrectly decided,48 that Swift had proved to be unworkable, 49 and
that Swift had created problems of forum shopping between state and
federal courts.50 The Supreme Court, however, specifically eschewed
relying on any of these rationales. The Court emphatically grounded
its decision in the limits of the Constitution: "If only a question of
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.
But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made
clear and compels us to do so." 51 Moreover, Erie is not limited to cases
in which the basis for the jurisdiction of the federal courts is diversity
of citizenship. 52
Although some have questioned how far Erie goes as a matter of
constitutional mandate,53 the primary Erie doctrine dictates that fed-
eral courts may not declare federal common law in those areas be-
yond Congress's legislative power (or some other federal power under
the Constitution). 54 Some scholars have suggested that, given the cur-
rent broad reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power, this aspect
48 The Court held in Swift that the words "laws of the several states" in the Rules
of Decision Act, requiring federal courts to follow state laws, meant only the laws
enacted by the legislature (including the interpretations by courts) and to local real
estate law, and did not apply to the construction of "questions of a more general
nature ... as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts... and especially
to questions of general commercial law." Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19. The Court
in Erie noted the criticism that this was an erroneous interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
49 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-78.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 77-78 (citation omitted).
52 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4520, at 635-36; HenryJ. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408 n.122
(1964) (characterizing the view that Erie only applies. in diversity cases as an "oft-en-
countered heresy"), cited with approval in Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
53 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4505, at 58 & n.31 (noting those who
question the constitutional basis for Erie).
54 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applica-
ble in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. ... "Supervi-
sion over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case
permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized
or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as
thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State .... "
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of Erie would leave it with little force. 55 After all, if Congress can,
under the Commerce Clause, regulate almost all aspects of American
life, then under the primary Erie doctrine, federal courts in diversity
cases could create a federal "Commerce Clause" common law for
these areas. 56
Nevertheless, in the case of Congress's Bankruptcy Power, the pri-
mary meaning of Erie retains significant force. Congress's Bankruptcy
Power has definite and discernible limits. Accordingly, when facing
an issue that is beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, federal
courts in bankruptcy must find and apply state law and may not rely
on a notion of federal bankruptcy common law.57
Id. (quotingJustice Field's dissent in Balt. & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893)); see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4505, at 60 (stating that the "broad
constitutional holding appears to be that neither Congress nor the federal courts can
create rules of law unless authorized to do so by the terms of the Constitution");
Bauer, supra note 21, at 1243 (analyzing the separation of powers aspect of Erie as the
Erie doctrine, but noting that Congress's authority to create federal courts and to
confer substantive jurisdiction "on them does not carry with it the power to create
substantive law in areas beyond the ability of Congress to legislate"); Ely, supra note
15, at 702-04 (arguing that Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson because the Constitution did
not give the federal government the general lawmaking authority that the Court had
been exercising under Swift); Field, supra note 21, at 923-24 (suggesting that the
primary Erie doctrine may be the only limit on the federal judiciary's common law-
making power); Friendly, supra note 52, at 394-95 (same); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There Lifefor Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 338-39
(1980) (same).
55 See Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 13; see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
15, § 4505, at 64-65 (stating that "[g]iven the expansive construction accorded the
Constitution's grants of legislative power, together with the deferential test for valid
congressional rulemaking, it is arguable that the significant limitations upon con-
gresssional rulemaking are more a matter of congressional will and the political pro-
cess than a matter of constitutional authority") (citations omitted).
56 See Field, supra note 21, at 923-24 (suggesting that the primary Erie doctrine
may be the only limit on the federal judiciary's common lawmaking power).
57 I do not rest my argument on the fact that bankruptcyjudges are not Article III
judges, appointed for life terms by the President and subject to confirmation by the
Senate. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the re-
spective circuits for fourteen-year terms. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1) (2000). Notwithstand-
ing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding
that bankruptcy judges who were not Article IIIjudges could not adjudicate a breach
of contract claim by a debtor in possession against a third party who had not filed a
claim in the bankruptcy case), and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)
(holding that a third party sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover a fraudulent
conveyance was entitled to a jury trial), I believe that bankruptcy judges have com-
plete power to adjudicate initially any issues that fall within the scope of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause. See generally Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and
Should Not Be Article IIIJudges, 72 AM. BAN, R. L.J. 567 (1998).
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B. The Limits of Congress's Bankruptcy Power
To apply the primary Erie doctrine in bankruptcy, a court must
first recognize the limits of Congress's Bankruptcy Power, that is, the
power to enact laws "on the subject of Bankruptcies." Although there
may be different views of what those limits are, there must be limits or
the federal government is no longer a government with delegated
powers. For the remainder of this Article, I will analyze the Erie doc-
trine under my interpretation of the constitutional limits of the Bank-
ruptcy Power.58 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the
Erie doctrine must be applied in bankruptcy regardless of the details
of the constitutional limits of Congress's Bankruptcy Power.
In my view, the subject of bankruptcies is limited to adjusting the
relationship between a debtor that is insolvent in some sense 59 and
that debtor's creditors. I deduce this interpretation of the "subject of
Bankruptcies" from the understanding of the term "bankruptcies"
when the Constitution was adopted, and from the various legislative
responses to bankruptcies before the adoption of the Constitution.
First, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the term "bank-
ruptcy" was synonymous with "insolvency." Both "bankruptcy" and
"insolvency" were used interchangeably in a variety of legislative acts
and other documents, and were defined in the contemporary diction-
aries as the condition of being unable to pay one's debts.60 Accord-
58 See Plank, supra note 9, at 1077-78.
59 Either the debtor's liabilities must exceed the debtor's assets, that is, the
debtor is insolvent under a balance sheet test, or the debtor must be generally unable
to pay debts as they become due, that is, the debtor is insolvent under a cash flow test.
Often a debtor in financial distress is insolvent in both senses, but it is not uncommon
to be solvent under a balance sheet test and still not be able to pay debts as they
become due. This situation occurs when the debtor's principal assets-such as
land-cannot quickly be converted into cash, and the debtor has insufficient cash or
other liquid assets to pay current debts. The Code uses both concepts. For most
situations under the Code in which "insolvency" is relevant, such as avoidance of
fraudulent and preferential transfers, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) (3), 548(a) (1) (B) (ii) (I),
the term "insolvent" means balance sheet insolvency. Id. § 101(32) (A), (B). Cash
flow insolvency, however, is a requirement for municipalities filing for bankruptcy
relief under Chapter 9 of the Code. Id. § 109(c) (3) (requiring a municipality to be
"insolvent"); see also id. § 101 (32) (C) (defining "insolvent" for a municipality to mean
.generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of
a bona fide dispute; or... unable to pay its debts as they become due"). Cash flow
insolvency is also a requirement for the entry of an order for relief under a contro-
verted involuntary bankruptcy petition. Id. § 303(h) (1) (providing that the court
shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case only if "the debtor is gener-
ally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are
the subject of a bona fide dispute").
60 See Plank, supra note 9, at 1077-78.
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ingly, the "subject of Bankruptcies" in the Constitution is the "subject
of debtors who are unable to pay their creditors."
Moreover, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, English
and American legislatures addressed the problem of debtors' inability
to pay their debts by enacting a variety of laws that, though different
in important respects, had certain common features and limitations.
The common features were a collective proceeding involving all of the
creditors by which the debtor's property was liquidated and the pro-
ceeds distributed pro rata to the creditors, or, in a few instances, a
collective proceeding in which all creditors were obligated to accept
an arrangement negotiated between the debtor and a majority of the
creditors. The common limitation of all of this legislation was that
none attempted to do more than alter the relationship between the
debtor and the creditors. No legislation regulated or created the
debtor-creditor relationship, or the property rights or contract rights
underlying that relationship. 61
From the language of the Bankruptcy Clause and the legislative
enactments that preceded it, I have derived four principles: the
Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, the Non-Expropriation Princi-
ple, the Non-Interference Principle, and the Debtor-Insolvency
Principle.
The Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle provides that Con-
gress has complete discretion to adjust the debtor-creditor relation-
ship. It may curtail the nonbankruptcy rights of a debtor for the
benefit of that debtor's creditors, and it may curtail the nonban-
kruptcy rights of some or all of those creditors against the debtor for
the benefit of the debtor or some or all of the other creditors. For
example, Congress may provide that any property interest that the
debtor could use to satisfy her debts outside of bankruptcy may, but
need not be, distributed to creditors in bankruptcy. Congress may
also provide that any liability of the debtor, regardless of how remote
or contingent, may be reduced, subordinated, or discharged. Con-
gress may also delay or modify any creditor remedies. 62
The Non-Expropriation Principle, however, forbids Congress
from expanding the rights of debtors or their creditors beyond that
necessary to adjust their relationship or from otherwise diminishing
either (1) the rights or prerogatives of parties outside of the debtor-
creditor relationship (third parties) for the benefit of the debtor or
the creditors, or (2) the nonbankruptcy rights of the debtor or the
creditors for the benefit of these third parties. For example, Congress
61 Id. at 1078-89.
62 Id. at 1089-91.
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may not (a) create rights or property interests for insolvent debtors or
their creditors that do not exist under state law or federal nonban-
kruptcy law; (b) appropriate property interests of third parties for dis-
tribution to creditors, including disregarding inherent limitations in
property interests of the debtor that inure to the benefit of a third
party; (c) alter the substantive legal relationship between a debtor and
another party to the extent that the relationship is not a debtor-credi-
tor relationship; or (d) create a liability that does not exist under state
law, nor expand an existing liability. 63
The Non-Interference Principle provides an important but lim-
ited constraint on the Non-Expropriation Principle. Under this prin-
ciple, Congress may prevent a third party from using its
nonbankruptcy entitlements to impede the bankruptcy process. Con-
gress may also prevent a third party from using the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition by a debtor to obtain a benefit that the third party
could not obtain outside of bankruptcy.6 4 Finally, the Debtor-Insol-
vency Principle provides that debtors may not be in bankruptcy unless
they are insolvent in some sense. 65 If a debtor is not insolvent, Con-
gress's discretion under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle
does not apply.
To the extent that these principles govern the limits of Congress's
Bankruptcy Power, they similarly constrain the rules that federal
courts in bankruptcy may choose when deciding an issue for which
the Code provides no clear guidance. Hence, if the issue to be de-
cided falls within the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle or Non-
Interference Principle, the court does not violate the primary Erie doc-
trine by adopting a federal rule. As discussed below, federal courts in
bankruptcy have done so in many instances. Several important provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code represent codification of judicial deci-
sions under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. For example, federal courts
in bankruptcy first authorized the rejection or acceptance of execu-
tory contracts and leases. 66 Congress added the statutory authority for
rejection and acceptance in 1938.67 Similarly, the power of the bank-
ruptcy trustee to abandon burdensome or inconsequential property of
63 Id. at 1091-92.
64 Id. at 1092-93.
65 Id. at 1093-95.
66 See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rjec-
tion, "59 U. COLO. L. REv. 845, 856-62 (1988).
67 See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (amending Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544, 565-66) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1978)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000));
see also Plank, supra note 9, at 1113-26 (analyzing why rejection or assumption of
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the estate, 68 first codified with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,
originated in judicial decisions under the Bankruptcy Act.69
Accordingly, a federal court in bankruptcy may, under the
Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, determine that a creditor in
possession of property items owned by the debtor must return them to
the bankruptcy trustee. 70 Under the Non-Expropriation Principle,
however, the court may not give the debtor in bankruptcy greater
rights in a property interest than it has outside of bankruptcy. On the
other hand, a court may prevent a third party from using its nonban-
kruptcy rights to interfere with the bankruptcy process or obtain a
benefit as the result of a bankruptcy case that it would not achieve
without the filing.7 1
executory contracts and leases under § 365 generally falls within the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle and the Non-Interference Principle).
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000). The question of what particular property items of
the debtor should be administered for the benefit of creditors falls well within the
'subject of Bankruptcies." See Plank, supra note 9, at 1096-100.
69 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 500-01
(1986) (describing the history of the abandonment power).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983). In this
case, the Court held that a bankruptcy court could direct the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, which had seized all the goods of Whiting Pools to obtain repayment of past due
taxes, to return the seized goods to Whiting Pools after it filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition. Id. at 209. The Court ostensibly relied on 11 U.S.C. § 542(a), id. at
205-08, but the plain language of the Code does not support the result. The Court
also relied upon some shaky legislative history and a general policy of favoring reor-
ganization. Id. at 207 n.16. I have severely criticized the Court's poor reasoning in
this case. See Plank, supra note 10, at 1234-54; Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Posses-
sion Under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REv. 253, 255-58,
301-07, 311, 343-44 (2000). Nevertheless, as an exercise in federal common law
rulemaking, the Court's decision falls squarely within the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment
Principle. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49
U. Prrr. L. REV. 477, 507-14 (1988) (suggesting that the Court should have acknowl-
edged that the Code did not accomplish Congress's intent and should have declared
simply that the Code provides for the result).
71 See Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5
B.R. 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980). In this case, an insurance company insured a race
track operated by Cahokia Downs. After Cahokia Downs became a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, the insurance company terminated the insurance policy under a
contractual provision authorizing either party to terminate the contract for any rea-
son upon thirty days notice. Id. at 530. The bankruptcy court half-heartedly held that
such action violated the automatic stay of acts to control property of the estate. Id. at
531 (stating that "cancellation of the insurance would certainly come within the provi-
sions of the automatic stay under § 362(a) (3)") (emphasis added). This conclusion is
wrong. The property of the estate consisted of the rights of the debtor under the
contract, and those rights were subject to termination for any reason. More impor-
tantly, the court noted that the Code authorized the trustee in bankruptcy to use
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C. Of Erie and Butner: Beyond the Primary Erie Doctrine
The dominant view of Erie is that considerations of separation of
powers embodied in the Constitution limit the ability of federal courts
to make federal common law in those areas that are within Congress's
powers but on which Congress has been silent.72 This view of Erie
follows logically from the facts of the case and the current broad view
of Congress's Commerce Clause power. The legal issue in Erie was the
standard of negligence to be applied to a railroad that injured an indi-
vidual walking along a common pathway next to the railroad's tracks.
Under its Commerce Clause power, Congress most likely can enact
legislation prescribing such a negligence standard. It had not done
so. In the absence of a congressional command or some other federal
interest, federal courts should not adopt a federal common law
standard.
property of the estate and that the Code prohibited ipso facto clauses that allowed
termination of contracts because of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Id. at 531.
The court also found as a fact that the primary reason for the termination of the
insurance policy was the filing of the petition. Id. Because the Code does not ex-
pressly prohibit the discretionary termination of contracts, this case presents an exam-
ple of a bankruptcy court creating a bankruptcy common law rule. Cahokia Downs
properly stands for the proposition that a party may not use a discretionary termina-
tion provision to terminate a contract when the only reason for doing so is the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. Such a proposition, though not expressly in the Code, falls
within the Non-Interference Principle, and does not violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle, because a party to a contract may not use its nonbankruptcy rights to inter-
fere with the bankruptcy process or use the filing of a bankruptcy petition to obtain a
benefit that it could not acquire outside of bankruptcy. The insurance company
stated that it canceled the contract because the race track lost its racing days and the
loss of racing days increased its risk. Id. at 532. However, the track lost its racing days
more than six months before the filing. Id. The filing of the bankruptcy petition
alerted the insurance company of its increased risk, a risk that it had or should have
anticipated in pricing its premium. Cancellation of the policy for no reason other
than the filing interferes with the bankruptcy process and, if not prevented, would
have allowed the insurance company to receive a benefit-the notice of and avoid-
ance of an increased risk that should have been included in the premium-that it
would not have had absent the filing.
72 See Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 13-14; see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 15, § 4505, at 60-68; Friendly, supra note 52, at 407 (noting with approval that
the promulgation of the primary Erie doctrine has "caused the principle of specialized
federal common law" to develop); PaulJ. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-
The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) (agreeing with John Hart Ely's discus-
sion of the primary Erie doctrine, see Ely, supra note 15 passim, but arguing that Erie
also constrains federal courts' common lawmaking powers in areas of congressional
power).
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Although it did not refer to Erie, the Supreme Court in Butner v.
United States73 applied this aspect of Erie. Butner acquired a second
mortgage on real estate of a bankrupt real estate developer, but did
not acquire a direct security interest in the rents collected on the real
estate. Under applicable state law, Butner would not have been enti-
tled to a security interest in the rents until he had taken certain steps,
such as appointment of a receiver or foreclosure of the mortgage.
Nevertheless, Butner asserted a perfected security interest in the rents
under a federal bankruptcy rule of equity adopted by courts of ap-
peals in two federal circuits that gave the mortgagee a security interest
in the rents upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition regardless of
state law.7 4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the
state law and ruled that Butner had no security interest in the rents.
Resolving a conflict among the federal circuits on whether to ap-
ply the relevant state law or the federal bankruptcy rule of equity, the
Supreme Court held that federal courts in bankruptcy should apply
the relevant state law and not the federal rule.75 The Court enunci-
ated the Butner principle: "Property interests are created and defined
by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result,
there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently
simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding." 76
Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the Butner principle in
Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue.77 In Raleigh, the State of Illi-
nois presented a claim for state taxes owed by the debtor in a bank-
ruptcy case based on a notice of tax liability. Under Illinois law, the
notice established the tax liability and the tax payer-the debtor in
Raleigh-had the burden of proving that the liability was incorrect or
invalid. The bankruptcy court, however, held that Illinois had the
burden of proving its claim for taxes in the bankruptcy case. The Su-
73 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
74 Id. at 53-54. Under the law in most states, a mortgagee could not get an inter-
est in the rents under the mortgage until it had taken some affirmative action, such as
obtaining appointment of a receiver, getting possession of the mortgaged property, or
commencing or completing foreclosure of the mortgage. Id. at 52-53 & nn.2-5. The
rationale for the federal equity rule was that the automatic stay in bankruptcy pre-
vented such creditor action, and the rule balanced the equities between the debtor/
mortgagor and the creditor/mortgagee. Id. at 53-54 & n.6.
75 Id. at 53-54.
76 Id. at 55.
77 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000).
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preme Court reversed, holding that a bankruptcy court was not free to
alter the burden of proof.
78
The Butner principle reflects the separation of powers aspect of
Erie that, in the absence of some federal interest, federal courts should
defer to state law in areas in which Congress may legislate, when Con-
gress has chosen not to establish a specific rule. Indeed, the Court in
Butner stated that, although Congress had not done so, the Bank-
ruptcy Clause "would clearly encompass a federal statute defining the
mortgagee's interest in the rents and profits earned by property in a
bankrupt estate." 79 This statement is imprecise. The Non-Expropria-
tion Principle precludes Congress from defining a mortgagee's prop-
erty interest. But, under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle,
Congress can determine the extent to which a mortgagee, as a credi-
tor, may share in the bankruptcy estate up to the limit of its claim;
whether or how to recognize a creditor's security interest in rents in
bankruptcy is within the scope of bankruptcy law.8 0
The Court's admonishment in Butner to rely on state law contains
an important caveat: State law applies "[u] nless some federal interest
requires a different result."81 Under the facts of Butner, this caveat is
correct. Because the issue before the Court was within the realm of
bankruptcy law, federal policy may overrule state law. The Butner
principle, however, fails to recognize another important limitation on
federal judicial power. When the issue is beyond the scope of the
Bankruptcy Clause, nonbankruptcy law must control. When the
78 Id. at 24-25 (stating that "[b]ankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name
of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of
creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides").
79 Butner, 440 U.S. at 54.
80 Under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, Congress is free to adopt any
particular rule on this issue that it believes would assist in adjusting the debtor's rela-
tionship with all of its creditors. It may give a mortgagee the first priority or no prior-
ity in rents generated by a debtor. It may abrogate the mortgagee's claim. Under the
Non-Expropriation Principle, however, it may not give the creditor an interest in
rents greater than that necessary to pay the creditor in full.
In 1994, Congress apparently eased the mortgagee's ability to perfect a security
interest in rents by allowing perfection by notice as a substitute for perfection by
seizure or by commencing an action. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 204, 108 Stat. 4106, 4122 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (2)
(2000)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act, however, revised another provision of the
Code, § 552 (b) (2), that was apparently intended to allow the continuation of security
interests in rents, but that is literally incompatible with revised § 546(b) (2). SeeDavid
Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1075, 1145-46 (1995) (describing
the interplay between § 552(b) (2) and § 546(b)).
81 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also supra text accompanying note 76 (quoting the
"Butner principle").
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nonbankruptcy law is state law (as it most often is), the primary Erie
doctrine, not Butner, dictates that federal courts in bankruptcy must
respect the limits of the Bankruptcy Power and defer to state law, even
if such state law produces a result that is contrary to what a court
thinks is proper "bankruptcy policy."
II. SCHOLARLY AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ERIE IN BANKRUPTCY
Few commentators or cases have addressed the role of Erie in
bankruptcy. In an article published in 1953 analyzing the extent to
which federal courts in bankruptcy may apply equitable principles to
overrule state law rights, Alfred Hill asserted that the principles of Erie
applied to bankruptcy.8 2 Hill reasoned that Congress's power under
the Bankruptcy Clause must have some limits.8 3 As an example, he
stated that a federal court in bankruptcy could not grant a divorce and
that it was unlikely that Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause could
authorize it to do so.8 4 Accordingly, he asserted that the power of
federal courts in bankruptcy to apply equitable principles to overrule
state law entitlements is constrained by the scope of Congress's Bank-
ruptcy Power.8 5
Hill's article, however, is limited. He did not try to define the
boundaries of Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause, and he
did not distinguish between actions that exceed Congress's constitu-
tional power and actions that contradict his view of good bankruptcy
policy. Moreover, he focused on only a few issues in which federal
courts used their equitable powers to overrule creditors' state law
rights.8 6 The examples that he analyzed-whether a claim of one
creditor should be subordinated to the claims of other creditors or
whether a creditor's claim should be disallowed-fall within the per-
missible scope of the Bankruptcy Power. 7 He did not distinguish the
primary Erie doctrine and the separation of powers Erie doctrine. In-
stead, his argument reflects the separation of powers aspect of Erie
and presages the Butner principle that, absent some discernible fed-
82 See Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1013, 1031-36,
1050 (1953).
83 Id. at 1036-38.
84 Id. at 1037-38.
85 Id. at 1035-39.
86 Id. at 1038-50.
87 Id. Hill did comment in one subpart that a federal court could not override
substantive state law when the trustee was seeking to recover from a noncreditor who
had injured the debtor or its property, but his principal purpose in doing so was to
distinguish a wrongdoer who was a creditor (and therefore could be subordinated to
other creditors) and one who was not. Id. at 1046-48.
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eral bankruptcy policy, federal courts should respect substantive state
law. 88
Twenty years later, Vern Countryman rejected the applicability of
Erie to bankruptcy in two well known articles published shortly before
the drafting and adoption of the Bankruptcy Code. 89 In these works,
Countryman urged Congress to reduce its reliance on state law in
bankruptcy. 90 The theoretical foundations of his argument, unfortu-
nately, are cloudy. At the outset, he asserted that Erie was limited to
diversity cases.91 He specifically disagreed with Alfred Hill's statement
that Erie does apply to bankruptcy.92 He also quoted with approval,
but out of context, Judge Friendly's statement in his concurring opin-
ion in Fore Improvement Corp. v. Selig (In re Tru-Seal Aluminum Products
Corp.)93 that "Congress is not required to direct the federal courts to
look to state law for the definition of state-created rights asserted in
bankruptcy, as it is when federal jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of
citizenship. The question is of intent, not of power."'g4 Countryman
concluded that, in cases in which the Bankruptcy Act was silent, courts
should reject state law whenever bankruptcy policy required such re-
88 This lack of distinction is evident in Hill's conclusion:
It has been shown that Swift v. Tyson stood for a philosophy of law which had
substantially the same implications on the equity side of the federal courts as
on the law side, and that the repudiation of this philosophy in Erie RR v.
Tompkins had similarly broad implications. It is now clear that the federal
courts may make substantive law only in effectuation of a policy derived from
the Constitution or from a valid act of Congress. The exercise of non-diver-
sity jurisdiction cannot expand their powers in this respect.
In bankruptcy this means that the power to override state law can be
determined only by reference to bankruptcy objectives .... [I]n view of the
amorphous nature of bankruptcy it is difficult to perceive how bankruptcy
objectives may be defined with any precision save in relation to particular
problems. Once the bankruptcy objectives are defined in a given situation,
the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts affords a flexible and effec-
tive instrument for attaining them.
Id. at 1050.
89 See Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 407 (1972) [hereinafter Countryman I]; Vern Countryman, The Use of State
Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 631 (1972) [hereinafter Country-
man I1].
90 See Countryman I, supra note 89 passim; Countryman II, supra note 89 passim.
91 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 409-11.
92 Id. at 410 (disagreeing with Hill, supra note 82, at 1034-35); see also supra notes
82-88 and accompanying text.
93 278 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J., concurring).
94 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 410 (quoting Fore Improvement, 278 F.2d at
147 (Friendly, J., concurring)).
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jection:9 5 "Erie should not be read to mean that state law must be
automatically applied."9 6
Countryman's rejection of Erie is unpersuasive. Perhaps because
he perceived no limits to bankruptcy law, he failed to make any dis-
tinction between permissible bankruptcy law and mandatory state law.
He did not refute the necessity to make this distinction and to respect
the constitutional requirement for the application of state law in
bankruptcy.
Countryman's argument reflects the federal policy exception to
the use of state law, an exception that complies with the separation of
powers aspect of Erie and that the Supreme Court enunciated in
Butner a few years after the publication of Countryman's articles. Al-
most all of the specific instances of state law that he urged Congress to
modify lie well within the reach of the Bankruptcy Power. These in-
clude (1) the option of the bankruptcy trustee to assume an executory
contract 9 7 and the abrogation of ipso facto clauses for executory con-
tracts;98 (2) disallowance of unconscionable claims and subordination
of the claims of improvident credit grantors;9 9 (3) a simplified and
more inclusive definition of property of the estate;10 0 (4) uniform pro-
visions for the exemption of property of the estate from creditor
claims;10 1 (5) clarification and modification of the rules on avoiding
preferential transfers, 10 2 judicial liens, 10 3 unperfected security inter-
ests,10 4 and the trustee's general avoidance power;10 5 (6) priorities
95 Id. at 410-11. Countryman cited Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934)
(rejecting a state law that provided that a wage garnishment survived a bankruptcy
discharge as incompatible with bankruptcy policy, and announcing that a prepetition
lien on wages of an individual did not extend to wages earned by an individual after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition). See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 411 n.23.
96 Countryman I, supra note 89, at 411.
97 Id. at 420. The trustee's power to assume executory contracts is constitutional
if the other party continues to receive the benefit of its bargain. See Plank, supra note
9, at 1113-26.
98 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 425-26; see also Plank, supra note 9, at
1126-28 (discussing the constitutionality of abrogating ipso facto clauses).
99 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 430-31.
100 Id. at 473-75; see also Plank, supra note 9, at 1096-100 (discussing the Debtor-
Creditor Adjustment Principle as it relates to the use of property interests of the
debtor to satisfy creditor claims). But see infra notes 115-16, 118 and accompanying
text (discussing Countryman's confused discussion of property resulting from the fail-
ure to distinguish when bankruptcy courts may override state law and when they must
respect state law).
101 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 475-76.
102 See Countryman II, supra note 89, at 635-39.
103 Id. at 640-45.
104 Id. at 655-56.
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among creditors;10 6 and (7) the extent of the discharge of the
debtor's debts.10 7 All of these issues fall within the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle or the Non-Interference Principle.
Countryman's reliance on Judge Friendly's concurrence in Fore
Improvement'0 8 suffers from the same limitation. Fore Improvement in-
volved the availability to a creditor of a right of set-off under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. This question is well within the constitutional realm of
bankruptcy.
Worse, Countryman took Judge Friendly's statement completely
out of context. The majority opinion, citing Hill's article, 10 9 stated
that the "determination of set-off would seem to be intimately related
to the distribution of the bankrupt's assets, the essential basis for fed-
eral concern." 110 The majority found that the claimed set-off did not
meet the "mutuality" requirement for set-off under the Bankruptcy
Act. 1 1 Judge Friendly's concurrence reached the same result by rely-
ing instead on state law. After noting that Congress was not required
to direct federal courts to look to state law in this case, 112 Judge
Friendly applied the separation of powers aspect of Erie and presaged
the Butner principle. "IT]he Bankruptcy Act must be read today in
the light of the policy of Erie... Absent any overriding bankruptcy
policy, it seems to me far more likely that Congress would wish the
,mutuality' of state-created claims to be determined by reference to
the law that gave them birth .... 113l Judge Friendly would have then
105 Id. at 658-63.
106 Id. at 663-67.
107 Id. at 668-73.
108 Fore Improvement Corp. v. Selig (In reTru-Seal Aluminum Prods. Corp.), 278
F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 94.
109 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
110 See Fore Improvement, 278 F.2d at 146.
111 Id. In Fore Improvement, a tenant had given its landlord a security deposit. Id. at
144. The tenant then defaulted on the lease, and the landlord obtained a judgment
against the tenant. Id. The tenant was then adjudicated a bankrupt, and the bank-
ruptcy trustee sought return of the security deposit. Id. The landlord sought to offset
the security deposit against its claim. Id. Under New York law, the security deposit
was to be held in trust for the tenant, but New York courts had permitted set-off when
the tenant sought return of the security deposit. Id. at 146. The federal court held
that, because of the trust characterization under New York law, the obligation to re-
turn the security deposit did not satisfy the mutuality requirement of the Bankruptcy
Act for a set-off, and it was not bound by the New York cases allowing set-off. Id.
112 Id. at 147 (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 94.
113 Fore Improvement, 278 F.2d at 147 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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ruled against the creditor on the grounds that the creditor had not
satisfied the mutuality requirements for a set-off under state law. 114
Neither the majority opinion nor Judge Friendly's concurrence
support the proposition that the primary Erie doctrine does not ex-
tend to bankruptcy law. At most they represent different views on the
extent to which a federal court in bankruptcy should defer to state law
on an issue that is within the constitutional realm of bankruptcy.
Countryman's failure to distinguish permissible bankruptcy law
and mandatory state law-the failure to distinguish the separation of
powers Erie doctrine and the primary Erie doctrine-led to confusion
in his analysis of property of the estate. First, Countryman misread a
pre-Erie Supreme Court case, Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson,115 for
the proposition that "[w]hat was 'property,' as that term is used in
section 70a(5) [of the Bankruptcy Act, defining property of the es-
tate], was said to be a 'federal question.' 116 As discussed below, this
is a questionable characterization of Chicago Board of Trade.1 17
Countryman followed this assertion with more confusion:
"[W]hile what is 'property' was a question of federal bankruptcy law,
the attributes of that property were still determined by state law.""',
This is an illogical statement. The determination of what is "property"
cannot be a federal question if the attributes of that property are de-
114 Id. at 148 (Friendly, J., concurring).
115 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
116 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 438 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade, 264
U.S. at 10). Further, Countryman followed his conclusion that "the meaning of 'prop-
erty' in section 70(5) [of the Bankruptcy Act] is a question of federal bankruptcy law,"
id., by analyzing cases that addressed the issue of whether an expectancy of future
receipts of property items would itself be treated as property. Almost all of the cases
that he discussed, however, involved whether such an expectancy would qualify as
property under federal nonbankruptcy law. Id. at 439-44. The cases include Williams
v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 539, 545 (1891) (upholding an award for indirect losses under
federal statute); Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1878) (upholding an award
of damage claims under a treaty with Great Britain); Milnor v. Metz, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
221, 227 (1842) (addressing a federal statute pay increase to a federal employee who
had previously been discharged in bankruptcy); Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409,
412-14 (1839) (upholding an award under a federal statute of sale proceeds to survi-
vors or heirs of customs agents who seized and sold a ship that was violating slave
trading laws); Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216-18 (1828) (upholding an
award for damage claims made pursuant to a treaty with Spain twenty-two years after
discharge of bankrupt); Harlan v. Archer, 79 F.2d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 1935) (finding no
existing property interest in claim of damages for condemnation of business later
authorized by federal private act); and In re Ghazal, "174 F. 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1909)
(finding right to a reward from the Secretary of the Treasury under federal statute for
informing on smugglers).
117 See infra Part V.B.
118 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 438.
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termined by state law. The statement can only make sense if we add a
distinction between what is "property"-the nonbankruptcy issue-
and what is "property of the estate" to be distributed to creditors-the
bankruptcy issue. Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, I 19 Con-
gress has no power under the Bankruptcy Clause to define what is
"property." Whether something is property-including its attrib-
utes-is a matter of state law. On the other hand, whether any partic-
ular property interest should be included in or excluded from the
bankruptcy estate is a bankruptcy law question within Congress's
Bankruptcy Power.
Finally, in a few instances, Countryman urged Congress to eschew
the use of state law for issues that lie beyond the permissible reach of
bankruptcy law without providing any justification for disregarding
mandatory state law. Specifically, he asserted that the state law right
of a party to a contract to demand adequate assurance of due per-
formance 120 should not constrain a bankruptcy trustee's decision to
assume or reject an executory contract.121 He also suggested that
Congress could authorize a bankruptcy trustee to transfer property
that is nontransferrable under nonbankruptcy law with no apparent
regard for the nonbankruptcy law entitlements of third parties. 122 In
neither instance, however, does he explain why bankruptcy law may
interfere with the rights of third parties who are not creditors.
In my view, these propositions violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle. 123 Bankruptcy law may not expropriate the rights of third
parties, such as a party to an executory contract 24 or a party who has a
119 See supra notes 63, 80 and accompanying text (describing the Non-Expropria-
tion Principle).
120 See U.C.C. § 2-609 (2001).
121 See Countryman I, supra note 89, at 421-23.
122 Id. at 474.
123 See supra notes 63, 80 and accompanying text (describing the Non-Expropri-
tion Principle).
124 Countryman's discussion on the question of adequate assurance of due per-
formance is problematic because he sees no limits on the trustee's power. The state
law right to demand adequate assurance of due performance should not prevent a
trustee from having a reasonable but short period of time to decide to assume or
reject, and the state law right to cancel the contract upon the failure to receive the
assurance can be stayed for a reasonable but short time. Nevertheless, the other party
should be able to suspend performance until receiving assurance, and the other party
should be fully compensated for any loss occasioned by delay. See Plank, supra note 9,
at 1122-26 (discussing why the Non-Expropriation Principle requires the bankruptcy
trustee to honor the state law right of the nondebtor party to an executory contract to
adequate assurance of due performance and to suspend performance pending such
assurance from the bankruptcy trustee).
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legitimate interest in the nontransferability of property interests in the
hands of a debtor.125
A few judicial decisions have addressed the applicability of Erie in
bankruptcy. The Supreme Court in Vanston Bondholders Protective Com-
mittee v. Green126 rejected the application of Erie in a bankruptcy case
in holding that a creditor was not entitled to interest on unpaid inter-
est despite the contract. The Court stated that "[i]n determining
what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall be distrib-
uted, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it
sits. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins has no such implication."1 2 7 If the
claims and assets exist, the Court's statement is correct as far as it
goes. Determining whether a creditor should receive interest owed
on its debt and how much of that interest it should receive is within
the permissible realm of bankruptcy law. The Court therefore con-
cluded that the bankruptcy policy favoring the equitable distribution
of the debtor's property required the denial of its claim for interest on
the unpaid interest. 128
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result but disagreed with the
majority's promulgation of a federal rule on the payment of interest
125 See Plank, supra note 9, at 1120-22 (discussing why the Non-Expropriation
Principle requires honoring the right of a party to an executory contract or lease to
prevent assignment to the extent that state law respects that right).
126 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
127 Id. at 162 (citations omitted); accord Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946).
The Heiser Court stated that "nothing decided in Erie R [sic] Co. v. Tompkins requires
a court of bankruptcy, in applying the statutes of the United States governing the
liquidation of bankrupts' estates, to adopt local rules of law in determining what
claims are provable, or to be allowed, or how the bankrupt's estate is to be distributed
among claimants." Id. at 732 (citations omitted). But the Court held that principles
of resjudicata precluded the bankruptcy court from relitigating a creditor's judgment
that the bankrupt and the bankruptcy trustee had unsuccessfully challenged in
nonbankruptcy court. Id. at 739-40.
128 See Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 165-67. This is a questionable result, and
the Court offers no explanation of why the denial of interest on interest is "equitable."
The secured creditors, holders of bonds secured by a mortgage on the debtor's prop-
erty, had bargained for the payment of interest on any unpaid interest, and the value
of the mortgaged property was sufficient to pay the outstanding principal, interest on
the principal, and interest on the unpaid interest. The bondholders had not received
payments of interest for more than five years, and the amount of the interest on
interest totaled approximately $500,000. Interest is simply compensation for the use
of money. The bondholders could not cause an immediate foreclosure of their secur-
ity interest and receive immediate payment, and the reorganization was for the bene-
fit of the unsecured creditors. Therefore, it hardly seems "equitable" to deprive the
bondholders of their entitlements-interest on their unpaid interest, if permitted by
state law-and divert their entitlements to the unsecured creditors.
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on the unpaid interest.' 29 His analysis neatly summarized both the
primary Erie doctrine and the Non-Expropriation Principle.' 3 0 First,
he noted that "it was beyond the power of federal law to create" the
claim for interest on the unpaid interest.1 31  He amplified this
statement:
The business of bankruptcy administration is to determine how ex-
isting debts should be satisfied out of the bankrupt's estate so as to
deal fairly with the various creditors. The existence of a debt be-
tween the parties to an alleged creditor-debtor relation is indepen-
dent of bankruptcy and precedes it .... Obligations to be satisfied
out of the bankrupt's estate thus arise, if at all, out of tort or con-
tract or other relationship created under applicable law. And the
law that fixes legal consequences to transactions is the law of the
several States. Except for the very limited obligations created by
Congress, .. . a debt is not brought into being by federal law. Obli-
gations exist or do not exist by force of State law though federal
bankruptcy legislation is in force .... The fact that subsequent to
the creation of a debt a party comes into a bankruptcy court has no
relevance to the rules concerning the creation of the obligation. 13 2
Justice Frankfurter recognized that existence of a claim may not re-
quire that the claim be allowed in bankruptcy. That is a matter for
bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter stated correctly that
the existence of a claim under state law is a necessary condition to its
allowance in bankruptcy:
Of course a State may affix to a transaction an obligation which...
federal courts need not enforce because of overriding considera-
tions of policy. And so, in the proper adjustment of the rights of
creditors and the desire to rehabilitate the debtor, Congress under
its bankruptcy power may authorize its courts to refuse to allow ex-
isting debts to be proven .... But the threshold question for the
allowance of a claim is whether a claim exists. And clarity of analysis
justifies repetition that except where federal law, wholly apart from
bankruptcy, has created obligations by the exercise of power
granted to the federal government, a claim implies the existence of
an obligation created by State law. If there was no valid claim
before bankruptcy, there is no claim for a bankruptcy court either
to recognize or to reject. 13 3
129 Id. at 167-73 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130 See supra notes 63, 80 and accompanying text (describing the Non-Expropria-
tion Principle).
131 See Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 169 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 169-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justice Frankfurter repeated his observation that if state law has not
created a claim, then a federal court in bankruptcy need not decide as
a matter of bankruptcy policy whether and to what extent that claim
should be recognized.13 4 Finding that, under the applicable state law,
the covenant to pay interest on interest was void, Justice Frankfurter
rejected the necessity for deciding whether bankruptcy policy permit-
ted or rejected the payment of interest on interest for fully secured
creditors.13 5 Indeed, if Justice Frankfurter was correct in his reading
of state law, the court could not include the claim in the bankruptcy
case.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY TRUST AND THE FEDERAL ENTITY EXCEPTION
Several years after Erie, the Supreme Court held in Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States136 that a federal court properly applies federal com-
mon law to a check issued by the federal government. 3 7 Clearfield
Trust was a guarantor of prior indorsements on a federal government
check that contained a forged indorsement of the payee's signa-
ture.138 The federal government was tardy in notifying Clearfield
Trust of the forgery.13 9 Under applicable state law, the delay would
have discharged the guarantor's liability.140 The Court held, however,
that Erie did not require the application of state law, that federal law
applied, and that in the absence of direct federal statutory authority,
federal courts could fashion a federal common law rule. 141 The Court
declined to apply Erie because the federal government had a direct
interest in a uniform rule that applied throughout the United
134 Id. at 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[N]othing comes into a bankruptcy court to which congressional policy can
apply unless it is an obligation created by applicable State law. And no obli-
gation finds its way into a bankruptcy court unless by the law of the State
where the acts constituting a transaction occur, the legal consequence of
such a transaction is an obligation to pay.
Id.; see also id. at 171:
[T]he existence of a debt comes about not by federal law but by force of
some State law, even though the right to enforce the debt, if it exists, may
raise federal questions if bankruptcy ensues. Bankruptcy legislation is super-
imposed upon rights and obligations created by the laws of the States.
135 Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (applying New York law).
136 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
137 Id. at 366.
138 See id. at 364-65.
139 See id. at 365.
140 See id. at 366.
141 Id.
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States. 1 42 The Court then applied a federal rule that the federal gov-
ernment's delay in notifying the guarantor of the forgery of a prior
indorsement did not automatically discharge the guarantor. 143 Since
Clearfield Trust, many courts have recognized that Erie does not apply
when a federal entity is a party to the issue being litigated. 144
Because of the dual nature of bankruptcy law-a federal law that
may or may not alter state law, depending on the issue- Clearfield
Trust and the primary Erie doctrine co-exist in bankruptcy. Clearfield
Trust is consistent with the exception in Butner that authorizes the use
of a federal bankruptcy rule.
Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code creates a federal entity. Many
have characterized the bankruptcy estate as this entity.145 Because the
Code defines the bankruptcy estate as a collection of assets, I believe
that this separate entity should more properly be characterized as the
142 Id. at 367.
143 The Court applied the rule of United States v. National Exchange Bank of Provi-
dence, 214 U.S. 302 (1909), that a delay in notification does not bar the United States'
cause of action for breach of a warranty of presentment. The Court had developed
this rule under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), as general commercial law,
no longer valid under Erie. Nevertheless, the Court accepted this rule as a good
source for a federal rule. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367-69. In addition, the
Court stated that delay in notification could be a defense. Id. at 369-70. The Court
affirmed the decision of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which
had held that an unreasonable delay that caused loss to the presenter could be a
defense and remanded the case for further proceedings. See United States v.
Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1942).
144 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4515, at 482-500.
145 See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 5.1, at 271 (1997)
(describing the estate as a separate and distinct legal entity); ELIZABETH WARREN, Busi-
NESS BANKRUPTCY 41 (1993); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 178 (4th ed. 2001) (commenting that the creation of
the estate is "as if a new corporation or a new trust had been established"); Donald P.
Board, Retooling "A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself, " 72 B.U. L. REv. 243,
260-63 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1990)); Ralph Brubaker, On the
Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41
WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 813 (2000) (arguing that the status of the bankruptcy estate
as a federal entity provides the foundation for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction); Jesse
M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517
(1996) (referring to the status of the bankruptcy estate in the context of executory
contracts); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 717, 721-22, 769-72 (1991) (arguing that the bankruptcy estate
should be viewed as a dynamic separate legal entity through which the different values
of the participants in the debtor's financial distress are recognized and reconciled).
But see Stephen McJohn, Person or Property? On the Legal Nature of the Bankruptcy Estate,
10 BANKR. DEv. J. 465, 470-71 (1994) (arguing that the bankruptcy estate is not a
separate legal entity).
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bankruptcy trust. The Code provides for the appointment of a trustee
(including the debtor in possession) with powers to operate a trust
estate, the bankruptcy estate, for a specific purpose and therefore cre-
ates an entity that has all of the primary attributes of a business or
statutory trust-long recognized as a distinct legal person.146 In any
event, whether the estate or the bankruptcy trust is the federal entity,
this federal entity provides the foundation for the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts in bankruptcy. 47 Thus, because the bankruptcy entity
serves as the basis of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, federal courts in
bankruptcy may create federal common law under the holding of
Clearfield Trust.
Clearfield Trust applies, however, only to the extent that the bank-
ruptcy trust as a federal entity is operating within its permissible con-
stitutional powers. In Clearfield, as the Court expressly noted, the
activities of the federal government that generated the issue to be re-
solved by federal common law-the issuance of its checks to pay its
debts-were well within the federal government's constitutional pow-
ers.1 48  Similarly, federal courts in bankruptcy may create federal
bankruptcy common law, if the Code is silent, when the issue involves
the adjustment of the insolvent debtor-creditor relationship.' 49
On the other hand, there is nothing in Clearfield Trust or its prog-
eny1 50 to suggest that a federal court can create federal common law
on issues that are outside of the scope of federal power under the
Constitution even if a federal entity is a party to the litigation. Con-
gress may not empower any federal entity to exceed Congress's limita-
tions under the Constitution. In a bankruptcy case, then, Congress
may not authorize a federal court to exceed the permissible scope of
bankruptcy law simply because the Bankruptcy Code creates a federal
entity, the bankruptcy trust.
For example, under the Non-Expropriation Principle, Congress
may not empower the bankruptcy trust or the bankruptcy estate as a
federal entity to expropriate the property of third parties for distribu-
tion to the debtor or the creditors. Congress may not empower a
bankruptcy court to give an individual debtor a divorce simply be-
146 See Thomas E. Plank, The Bankruptcy Trust as a Legal Person, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 251 (2000).
147 See Brubaker, supra note 145, at 813-31.
148 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ("The rights
and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law. When the Unites States disburses its funds or pays its
debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power.").
149 See, e.g., supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
150 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4515, at 482-500.
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cause the activities of the bankruptcy trust may result in a discharge of
the debtor's debts and give the debtor a "fresh start." Federal courts
in bankruptcy have no greater power. Federal courts may implement
the Bankruptcy Code within the limits of the Bankruptcy Power. The
status of the bankruptcy trust as a federal entity does not authorize
federal courts to create a federal common law rule in bankruptcy that
exceeds what Congress can do under the Bankruptcy Power.
IV. EQUITy AND ERiE IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Federal Courts' Equitable Powers Under Erie
Before Erie, federal courts exercised broad powers as courts of
equity, including the power to grant forms of equitable relief in diver-
sity cases that were not available in state courts. 151 Erie called into
question the extent to which federal courts could disregard state law
in the name of equity. 152 Several years later, the Supreme Court in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York153 held that a federal court's equity powers
could not materially affect the substantive rights of diversity liti-
151 See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 114-17 (1915) (authorizing the grant of
injunctive relief even though not available under Illinois law); see also Waterman v.
Canal-La. Bank & Tr. Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43-47 (1909) (upholding the federal court's
jurisdiction to determine the rights of a legatee under a will without interfering with
the administration of the estate by the state probate court); Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150
U.S. 202, 204-06 (1893) (holding that a creditor could maintain a bill in equity for
the return of fraudulently transferred property notwithstanding an adequate remedy
at law that would preclude such a bill under state law); Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451,
457-58 (1892) (holding that the federal rule of equity allowing compensation to
trustees, including reimbursement for attorneys' fees, in administering a trust pre-
vailed over a state law provision disallowing the payment of attorneys' fees); Mc-
Conihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1887) (holding that a bill in equity to quiet
title to land could be maintained in federal court notwithstanding the availability of
an action for ejectment under state law that would preclude such a bill); Payne v.
Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869) (holding that a federal court could entertain
a suit in equity for an accounting and other equitable relief against an administrator
of an intestate's property notwithstanding state law that permitted such actions in the
state probate court); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 653-59 (1835) (holding
that a federal court could entertain a suit in equity to declare a sale of land to be
merely a pledge and to have an accounting of rents and profits of the property de-
spite the absence of such relief under Louisiana law); United States v. Howland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819) (holding that a creditor could maintain a bill in
equity for the return of property even though such bill could not be maintained in
state court because state law granted the creditor a remedy at law); 19 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 4513, at 425-29; Hill, supra note 82, at 1027-29.
152 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4513, at 434.
153 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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gantsI 54 and that therefore a suit brought in federal court was subject
to the applicable state's statute of limitations. In its discussion, how-
ever, the Court did not eliminate all federal court equity powers. It
noted that "federal equity is a separate system . . . properly under-
stood,"'155 by which federal courts may afford relief that the Court of
Chancery could have afforded in England in the eighteenth cen-
tury.156 Indeed, the Court specifically noted that a "federal court may
afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a
State even though a State court cannot give it.' 5 7 Nevertheless,
broader notions of a general equity power "have been replaced by a
sharper analysis of what federal courts do when they enforce rights
that have no federal origin." I58
During the first half of the twentieth century, federal courts in
bankruptcy relied heavily on their equity powers to override creditors'
state law rights in resolving issues on which the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 was silent. 159 A prominent example is the 1935 Supreme Court
154 Id. at 108-09. The Court noted that the right to recover was derived from the
state and not the United States, and held that
since a federal court adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only an-
other court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is
made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement
of the right as given by the State.
Id.
155 Id. at 105.
156 Id.; Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939); Hill, supra
note 82, at 1027-29.
157 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 106.
158 Id. at 112.
159 Federal courts' equity powers also played an important role in reorganizing
insolvent corporations before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 through
the creation of the equity receivership. The equity receivership first developed in the
nineteenth century, when there was no bankruptcy law in effect, to resolve the insol-
vency of interstate railroads. At the petition of a creditor or the railroad, a federal
court would, under its general powers as a court of equity, appoint a receiver who
would operate the railroad until it could be sold as a going concern instead of being
liquidated. Use of the equity receivership expanded to corporations and became the
dominant method for corporate reorganization until the 1930s, when Congress ad-
ded comprehensive reorganization provisions to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See 6
COLLIER ON BANKRup-rcy 0.04, at 28-61 (James Wm. Moore ed., 14th ed. Supp.
1978) (noting that "reorganization through a federal equity receivership was easily
the most popular and practicable procedure available prior to the enactment in 1933
and 1934 of §§ 77 and 77B"); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERiCA 50-69, 100-23 (2001) (describing the development of
the equity receivership and its replacement by the corporate reorganization acts of
1934-1938); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States,
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decision, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway Co., 160 involving a railroad reorganization
under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.161 In Rock Island, the
railroad filed a petition for reorganization and requested an injunc-
tion prohibiting several secured creditors holding mortgage bonds is-
sued by the railroad as collateral from selling the collateral to repay
their debts. 162 No specific provision of the Bankruptcy Act authorized
such an injunction.1 6 3 Nevertheless, the district court sitting as a
bankruptcy court granted the request, 164 and the Supreme Court up-
held the injunction. 165 The Court stated that a bankruptcy court was
essentially a court of equity1 6 6 and that the power to issue an injunc-
tion when necessary to prevent the impairment of its jurisdiction was
inherent in a court of bankruptcy as a court of equity.
167
3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 21-23 (1995) (stating that the use of equity receivership
"blossomed in the late nineteenth century").
160 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
161 Id. at 656-57.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 651.
164 Id. at 666.
165 Id. at 675-84.
166 The Court quoted the statutory language giving bankruptcy courts "such juris-
diction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 675 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 11
(1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also relied on the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000)),
which authorized U.S. courts "to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute,
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
167 Id. The Court also recited the grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts in
section 2(15) of the Act to issue orders necessary for the enforcement of the Act's
provisions. Id. at 676 (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (15) (1934) (em-
powering the bankruptcy court to "make such orders, issue such process, and enter
such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of this act")).
In addition, the Court noted that the bankruptcy court had summaryjurisdiction
over the debtor's "property." It stated that the debtor had equity in the collateral,
that this equity was a property interest, and that it was "property" within the statutory
grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 681, 683. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
bankruptcy court had the power to issue the injunction and had properly exercised its
discretion. Id. at 676. See generally Plank, supra note 70 (discussing Rock Island and
other related cases). The Court also held that the reorganization provisions of sec-
tion 77 were within the congressional power under the Bankruptcy Clause. Id. at 671.
See generally Thomas E. Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487,
541-42 (1996) (discussing the Court's views of Congress's power to legislate under
the Bankruptcy Clause).
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In several cases decided after Erie, the Supreme Court upheld the
reliance by the bankruptcy courts on their equitable powers to over-
rule creditors' state law rights. For example, in Taylor v. Standard Gas
& Electric Co.,168 the Court held that considerations of equity and the
conduct of the holder of all the debtor's common stock who also held
debt claims against the debtor required the subordination of those
debt claims to the claims of unaffiliated holders of preferred stock. 169
In Pepper v. Litton,170 the Court held that the bankruptcy court had the
power to disallow the claim of the debtor's stockholder for salary, evi-
denced by a confessed judgment entered under questionable
circumstances. 171
These decisions are consistent with the primary Erie doctrine.
These cases involved the use of the special federal bankruptcy com-
mon law power to adjust the debtor-creditor relationship when the
Bankruptcy Act was silent. None exceeded the Bankruptcy Power.
Enjoining a creditor's collection action against the debtor or subordi-
nating one creditor of a debtor to another falls squarely within the
Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle and therefore is within the
"subject of bankruptcies."
On the other hand, in Callaway v. Benton,172 the Court rejected
the use of federal equity powers in a situation that was beyond Con-
gress's Bankruptcy Power. In this case, an insolvent railroad leasing
real estate, including railroad lines, from another railroad not in
bankruptcy proposed a plan of reorganization providing that the reor-
ganizing railroad would acquire the other railroad's reversionary in-
terest in the real estate. 173 The lessor railroad agreed to sell its
reversion if a majority of its stockholders approved the sale, which
they did. 174 Minority shareholders of the lessor railroad then sought
an injunction in Georgia courts against the sale on the grounds that
Georgia law required unanimous stockholder approval of a sale of all
of the lessor's assets. 175 The trustee for the reorganizing railroad
sought a permanent injunction against the state court litigation,
which the federal district court sitting as a court of bankruptcy
168 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
169 Id. at 313-14, 322-23, see also Hill, supra note 82, at 1014-15 (discussing
Taylor).
170 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
171 Id. at 296, 311-12.
172 336 U.S. 132 (1949).
173 Id. at 134-36 & 134 n.1.
174 Id. at 136 (noting that 30,137 shares voted in favor of the sale and 9057
opposed).
175 Id. at 135-36.
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granted. The district court held that the state action interfered with
the consummation of the reorganization plan and that the question of
the legal standards for the seller's approval of the sale was a federal
and not a state law question. 17 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the
reversal.
First, the Supreme Court noted that the Bankruptcy Act "gives no
clue to what proportion of the lessor's stockholder must vote to accept
the offer if state law is not controlling."' 77 The Court then held that
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate did not
give it jurisdiction to decide the state law issue: 178 "Congress did not
give the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies
that in some way affect the debtor's estate." 79 The bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction over the debtor's interest in the railroad property, a
leasehold interest, but it did not have jurisdiction over the lessor's re-
versionary interest, the subject of the state court action.18 0
The Court expressly found no basis in the Bankruptcy Act for the
injunction:
The bankruptcy power unquestionably gives the ... court, working
within the framework of the [Bankruptcy] Act, full and complete
power not only over the debtor and its property, but also, as a corol-
lary, over any rights that may be asserted against it. These rights
may be altered in any way thought necessary to achieve sound finan-
cial and operation conditions for the reorganized company, subject
to the requirement of the Act. The purchase of formerly leased
property does not involve rights asserted against the debtor, how-
ever .... We conceive the jurisdiction asserted by the district court
over a solvent lessor not in reorganization to be an extension of
these traditional powers not justified by any provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 18 1
The Court did not indicate any constitutional basis for the limitation
on the bankruptcy court's power. Nevertheless, it is my view that the
limits of the Bankruptcy Clause, and specifically the Non-Expropria-
tion Principle, prevented the bankruptcy court from interfering with
the state law rights of the stockholders of the nondebtor railroad.
176 Id. at 136-37.
177 Id. at 139. The Court also rejected other proffered statutory grounds for the
injunction. Id. at 139-40 (concluding that the Interstate Commerce Act did not au-
thorize the injunction).
178 Id. at 141-42.
179 Id. at 142.
180 Id. at 142-44.
181 Id. at 147-48.
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It remains fashionable to say that bankruptcy courts are "courts of
equity."18 2 This statement had some validity under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 because under that Act the "bankruptcy court" was the
U.S. District Court, which did have broad equity powers.' 83 This char-
acterization, however, is not accurate under the Bankruptcy Code.
Under the Code, bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts and do
not have the full equity powers of Article III courts.18 4 They are courts
of limited jurisdiction that do have some equitable powers. 8 5 As the
successors to the "commissioners of bankrupt" under the English
Bankrupt Acts, 186 the justices of the peace under the English Insol-
vency Acts,1 87 the commissioners under the Bankruptcy Act of
1800,188 and the referees under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,189 how-
ever, bankruptcy courts have never been part of the equity court sys-
tem.190 They have, and can only have, those equitable powers that
Congress can grant them under the Bankruptcy Clause.
Whatever the status of federal courts in bankruptcy as "courts of
equity," the Supreme Court has reined in their ability to use equity as
a means of altering state created rights even in areas well within Con-
182 See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002). In holding that a
lookback period allowing the Internal Revenue Service to collect taxes against a
debtor was equitably tolled during an earlier bankruptcy case, the Court in 2002
stated that "bankruptcy courts ... are courts of equity and 'appl[y] the principles and
rules of equity jurisprudence."' Id. (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939),
which was decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898); see also Marcia S. Krieger, "The
Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 275-76
(1999) (noting correctly that the frequent but misleading characterization of the
bankruptcy court as a court of equity more often confuses than clarifies the role of
the bankruptcy court).
183 See Bankruptcy Act of1898, 11 U.S.C. § 11(15) (1976) (repealed 1978); see also
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
184 See generally Plank, supra note 57 (arguing that bankruptcy judges need not be
Article III judges to adjudicate bankruptcy law issues).
185 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000) (providing that the bankruptcy court "may issue
any order, process, orjudgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of [title 11]").
186 See generally Plank, supra note 57, at 575-90 (discussing the role of commission-
ers of bankrupt adjudicating bankruptcy issues under the English Bankrupt Acts).
187 See generally id. at 596-99 (discussing the role ofjustices of the peace adjudicat-
ing bankruptcy issues under the English Insolvency Acts).
188 See generally id. at 606-10 (discussing the role of commissioners adjudicating
bankruptcy issues under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800).
189 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33, 34, 38, 39, 30 Stat. 544, 555-56 (codi-
fied as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 61, 62, 66, 67 (1976) (repealed 1978)) (specifying the
appointment, jurisdiction, and duties of referees, the predecessors to current bank-
ruptcy judges).
190 See Krieger, supra note 182, at 277-85.
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gress's Bankruptcy Power. For example, the Court in Butner v. United
States' 9 1 imposed significant limitations on a bankruptcy court's ability
to rely on principles of equity to alter a creditor's state law rights. In-
deed, although many courts have cited Butner for the proposition that
federal courts in bankruptcy should look to state law,1 92 Butneris more
significant for signaling the demise of a broad use of equity powers by
courts to "do equity." The Court stated:
The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important part
in the administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations in
which the judge is required to deal with particular, individualized
problems. But undefined considerations of equity provide no basis
for adoption of a uniform federal rule affording mortgagees an au-
tomatic interest in the rents as soon as the mortgagor is declared
bankrupt.193
The Supreme Court recently reiterated Butner's limitations on the use
of a federal equity power in bankruptcy in United States v. Reorganized
CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,194 United States v. Noland,195 and most
recently Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue.196
Butner and these more recent decisions limit the ability of federal
courts in bankruptcy to use a general equity power to overrule state
law entitlements when Congress has not specified a particular rule
even though Congress does have the power under the Bankruptcy
191 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
192 See supra note 25.
193 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55-56.
194 518 U.S. 213, 228-29 (1996).
195 517 U.S. 535, 539-43 (1996). In both CF&Iand Noland, the lower courts sub-
ordinated noncompensatory tax penalty claims to the claims of general unsecured
creditors on the grounds that it would be inequitable to allow such claims to reduce
the recoveries of creditors who suffered actual pecuniary losses. CF&I, 518 U.S. at
217-18; Noland, 517 U.S. at 537-39. This ability to subordinate certain creditors'
claims on equitable grounds was a power historically exercised by bankruptcy courts
and is not codified in the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000). Seegener-
ally Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 94-100 (1996) (discussing equitable
subordination and the Noland and CF&I cases). Nevertheless, in Noland, the Su-
preme Court reversed the equitable subordination in this case and held "that (in the
absence of a need to reconcile conflicting congressional choices) the circumstances
that prompt a court to order equitable subordination must not occur at the level of
policy choice at which Congress itself operated in drafting the [Bankruptcy] Code."
517 U.S. at 543.
196 530 U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000) ("Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name
of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of
creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides.").
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Clause to do so. These decisions show a respect for federalism inher-
ent in the separation of powers aspect of the Erie doctrine.
This respect for the separation of the judicial and legislative pow-
ers inherent in Butner and these other cases does not contradict the
primary Erie doctrine. Congress could have empowered federal courts
in bankruptcy to use a far-reaching federal bankruptcy equity power
to resolve the issues that arose in Butner and the other cases. These
cases involved the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship. On
the other hand, Congress can not expand its power under the Consti-
tution by delegating to a federal court a broad equity power. Under
the primary Erie doctrine, then, federal courts in bankruptcy may not
use their equity power to go beyond Congress's power under the Con-
stitution. To the extent that equity plays a role in bankruptcy, that
role must be confined to the limits of bankruptcy law.
B. Expropriation in the Name of Equity
Despite the many admonitions of the Supreme Court and other
courts to limit their use of equity powers to matters authorized by the
Code, some federal courts in bankruptcy have used their powers as
courts of equity under § 105 of the Code19 7 to abrogate state law inter-
ests of creditors in ways that exceed Congress's Bankruptcy Power.
The mandatory release of creditor claims against nondebtor co-obli-
gors is a prominent example of actual impermissible expropriation of
creditors' rights for the benefit of third parties. A related, but permis-
sible, use of equity if properly constrained is the temporary stay of
creditor actions against nondebtor co-obligors.
1. Nondebtor Releases
When a debtor enters bankruptcy, creditors may naturally seek to
collect all or a part of the debts owed to them from other persons who
may share liability with the debtor. These other nondebtor co-obli-
gors may include officers; directors; shareholders of the debtor; the
debtor's insurers; lenders to the debtor; underwriters and financial
and investment advisors for the debtor; and otherjoint tortfeasors. In
Chapter 11 cases and their predecessors under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898,198 these debtors and the related nondebtor co-obligors have for
many years sought, pursuant to a confirmed reorganization plan or
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (providing that the bankruptcy court "may issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of [title 11]").
198 See, e.g., Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132 (1949); see also supra notes 172-81
and accompanying text.
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the bankruptcy court's equitable powers under § 105, to obtain the
voluntary and involuntary release by creditors of claims that such cred-
itors may have against the nondebtor co-obligors. Many courts have
refused to allow involuntary releases of nondebtors, 99 and at least
one court has disallowed even voluntary releases. 200 Nevertheless, de-
spite the absence of any specific statutory authority, some courts have
approved plans that release some or all of these nondebtor co-obligors
from their liability to creditors. These courts often enter an accompa-
nying mandatory injunction preventing the affected creditors from
pursuing their claims against the released nondebtor co-obligors.20
In re Dow Coming Corp.202 illustrates the use of nondebtor re-
leases. This case involved a confirmed reorganization plan for the
Dow Corning Corporation that resolved massive tort litigation against
Dow Corning for its sale of silicon gel breast implants. The plan con-
tained mandatory releases of claims against nondebtors and enjoined
any action to enforce a claim against the specified nondebtors. Specif-
ically, the plan provided that personal injury claims held by Dow
Corning's creditors against the debtor's shareholders, subsidiaries,
other affiliates, their representatives, insurance companies that had
settled with the debtor, and physicians and health care providers that
settled with the debtor were deemed waived and released. 203 The
plan also provided that the holders of these claims were enjoined
from commencing or continuing any action seeking to enforce their
claims against the released parties. 204 Moreover, many of the claims
199 See Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting
Jurisdictional Precepts and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANIK. L.J. 1,
10-11 & n.46 (1998) (describing cases disallowing nonconsensual releases of
nondebtors).
200 See Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. AJ. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50
B.R. 756, 763 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (holding that bankruptcy court does not have
jurisdiction to authorize consensual nondebtor releases).
201 See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical
Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 959,
962-64 (describing prominent cases allowing nonconsensual releases); Brubaker,
supra note 199, at 2-6 (same); see also In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 203 F.3d 203, 212-13,
215 (3d Cir. 2000) (surveying the law regarding nondebtor releases and reversing a
bankruptcy court order approving a reorganization plan containing a nonconsensual
release of the debtor's officers and directors); Sally S. Neely, The Continuing Debate re:
Non-Debtor Releases/Permanent Injunctions in Chapter 11, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REOR-
GANIZATIONS 385 (ALI-ABA eds., May 1-3, 2003).
202 Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Coming Corp.),
280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'g In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
203 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. at 475.
204 Id.
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were released and enjoined whether the creditors had consented to
the plan or not.
The bankruptcy court had confirmed the plan, but held that the
nondebtor co-obligor releases applied only to creditors who voted to
accept the plan. 20 5 The district court affirmed the confirmation of
the plan, but overruled the bankruptcy court's ruling regarding the
nonconsenting creditors. 20 6 It held that the plan's provision releasing
the nondebtor co-obligors bound nonconsenting creditors. 20 7 On fur-
ther appeal, the court of appeals held that the bankruptcy court had
the power to release nondebtor co-obligors from the claims of non-
consenting creditors but that there was insufficient factual basis for
such action.20 8 On remand, the district court made specific findings
and approved the mandatory release of nonconsenting creditors. 20 9
Dow Corning illustrates the tremendous difficulties that attend
mass tort litigation against a company, its parents, its affiliates, and
other defendants, including insurance companies and, in the case of
medical products, physicians and health care providers. It also illus-
trates the tendency of federal courts in bankruptcy to exalt a success-
ful reorganization plan over all other values. In the case of Dow
Corning, the desire to implement a successful reorganization of a
debtor using bankruptcy to resolve its potential mass tort liability al-
lowed Dow Corning's two stockholders, Corning, Inc., and Dow
Chemical Corp., to use their control over the debtor to obtain releases
from their creditors that they could not have obtained outside of
bankruptcy.210
Professor Ralph Brubaker has convincingly demonstrated that
mandatory, involuntary releases of nondebtor co-obligors violates
sound bankruptcy policy and exceeds the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts. 21 1 I take this view one step further. Beyond questions of pol-
icy and jurisdiction, in my view, the involuntary release of claims that
205 Id.
206 Id. at 480-81.
207 Id.
208 See Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.),
280 F.3d 648, 655-58 (6th Cir. 2002).
209 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. 396 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Because the
bankruptcy judge who had presided over the proceedings recused himself in Decem-
ber 2001, the district judge withdrew the reference of this case from the bankruptcy
court and made the necessary findings. Id. at 401-02.
210 In re Dow Coming Corp., 280 F.3d at 654-55.
211 See Brubaker, supra note 201 passim (discussing how nondebtor releases violate
both bankruptcy policy and the limits on bankruptcy jurisdiction); Brubaker, supra
note 199 passim (describing why bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to grant noncon-
sensual releases of nondebtors).
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creditors of the debtor have against nondebtor co-obligors violates the
Non-Expropriation Principle and therefore exceeds Congress's power
under the Bankruptcy Clause. Federal courts in bankruptcy may not
approve or enforce such releases, no matter how much the releases
may be "equitable" or useful for a successful reorganization.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the nondebtor co-obligor releases
on the parties:
FIGURE 1
C 4 *TP owes C TP
[deemed released]
D owes C [D owes TP for
[deemed discharged] reimbursement for C's
claim against TP]
D
Assume that creditor C has a products liability claim against
debtor D for $100. Assume also that C has a claim against TP for the
same cause of action on the grounds that TP is jointly and severally
liable under state law. In many cases, when creditor C has a claim
against both the debtor D and the nondebtor third party TP, the third
party TP will also have a contingent claim against D for indemnifica-
tion or contribution and will therefore also be a contingent creditor
of the debtor. Certainly, against the debtor D and its property, Con-
gress may regulate these creditors, C and TP. Congress has done so
by (1) disallowing the claims of the contingent creditor- TP in our
example-who has a contingent claim for reimbursement or contri-
bution against the primary debtor 212 - C in our example-but (2,
providing that the contingent creditor- TP-is subrogated to the
rights of the primary creditor, C.213 If C can only obtain $50 from D's
212 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B)-(C) (2000) (providing that the court shall disal-
low any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the
debtor on, or has secured, the claim of a creditor, to the extent that such claim for
reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the time of allowance or disallow-
ance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution, or such entity asserts a right of
subrogation to the rights of such creditor).
213 Id. § 509 (providing that, except as otherwise provided in the section, an entity
that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, a claim of a creditor against the
debtor, and that pays such claim, is subrogated to the rights of the creditor to the
extent of such payment).
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bankruptcy case but $100 from TP, obviously Cwould prefer to collect
from TP. TP would then collect $50 out of D's bankruptcy case. TP
will have suffered a loss of $50.214
Under Dow Coming, however, C can only look to D's bankruptcy
case for payment of its claim; TP will suffer no loss and will not need
to present its subrogated claim against D. Discharging C's claim
against D is well within the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle
under the Bankruptcy Clause. Absent some other consideration,215
however, abrogating C's claim against TPviolates the Non-Expropria-
tion Principle.2 1 6 The Bankruptcy Clause does not allow an adjust-
ment of the relationship between the creditor C and the third party
TP unless TP is a debtor in a separate bankruptcy case. Destroying
the rights of the primary creditor C against TP is expropriating a
property interest of C- C's right to payment from TP-for the benefit
of TP.
One may argue that such expropriation is necessary to effect a
successful reorganization plan. For example, officers, directors, and
shareholders may not agree to adopt a plan unless they obtain that
extra benefit. Nevertheless, a policy favoring reorganization does not
allow either Congress or federal courts in bankruptcy to exceed bank-
ruptcy law's constitutional limitation to adjusting the relationship be-
tween a debtor and the creditors of that debtor.2 1 7 Judicial approval of
214 If C had collected $50 from D, the result would be the same. C would still be
entitled to collect an additional $50 from TP. Since C's claim against D would be
discharged, and TP is only subrogated to C's claim, TP would have to pay C $50 and
would not be able to recover anything from D.
215 If TPs obligation to C is part of the property of D's estate, as in the case of an
insurance policy and its proceeds covering D's liability to C, and C's attempt to collect
from TP would deplete the assets available to all of D's creditors, then temporarily
preventing C from collecting from TP until conclusion of the bankruptcy case is per-
mitted under the Non-Interference Principle. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text (discussing the Non-Interference Principle); infra note 226 (discussing permissi-
ble injunctions of creditor actions against third party insurers when the insurance
proceeds are part of the bankruptcy estate).
216 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
217 Congress has specifically authorized the expropriation of the creditor's rights
against a nondebtor co-obligor. See 11 U.S.C. § 52 4 (g). This section provides that a
court confirming a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 may enjoin entities from
recovering damages for future tort liability from asbestos if the plan of reorganization
establishes a trust to pay such damages in whole or in part. Id. § 5 2 4(g) (1) (A)-(B).
This injunction may bar any action directed against third parties alleged to be directly
or indirectly liable with the debtor for such liability by reason of being (1) an owner
of the debtor or of an affiliate or predecessor in interest of the debtor; (2) a manager,
officer, director, or employee of the debtor; (3) an insurer of the debtor; or (4) a
lender, underwriter, or financial or investment advisor to the debtor. Id.
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these permanent involuntary nondebtor co-obligor releases violates
the primary Erie doctrine. 218
Theoretically, voluntary nondebtor releases would not violate the
Non-Expropriation Principle. Because of the costs and uncertainties
of collecting from TP, C might be willing to accept $50 from D's bank-
ruptcy case in return for a release of TP. One must be suspicious,
however, about whether such releases are truly voluntary. An impor-
tant test would be whether the creditors approving a plan that waives
their rights to pursue claims against nondebtor co-obligors received
§ 524 (g) (4) (A). The section does provide some protection for the interests of the
future claimants by requiring that the court appoint a legal representative to protect
the rights of the future claimants, and that the court determines whether enjoining
such future claimants is fair and equitable, in light of the benefits provided to such
trust by or on behalf of such debtor or third party. Id. § 5 2 4 (g) (4) (B). This require-
ment, however, does not cure the constitutional violation.
The provisions of § 524(g), enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-394, § 111(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4113-17 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)),
were applied retroactively to plans dealing with mass asbestos claims that were con-
firmed before its enactment. Id. § 524(h).
218 The court of appeals in Dow Corning stated that a mandatory release of and
injunction against nonconsenting creditors is appropriate only in "unusual circum-
stances." Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.),
280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002). The court required the presence of the following
seven factors:
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party,
usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the nondebtor is,
in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate;
(2) The nondebtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization;
(3) The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization
hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who
would have indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor; (4) The
impacted class, or classes, has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan; (5)
The plan provides a mechanism to pay for all, or substantially all, of the class
or classes affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides an opportunity
for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in full and; (7) The
bankruptcy court made a record of specific factual findings that support its
conclusions.
Id. The district court on remand made the necessary finding to uphold the plan.
None of these factors cures the constitutional defect. Even the factor requiring a
mechanism for paying all or substantially all of the affected creditors is not sufficient.
The federal court in bankruptcy does not have the jurisdiction to make this determi-
nation. If the affected creditors were in fact being paid in full, then they would volun-
tarily release their claims against the nondebtor obligor. The fact that some of the
creditors in Dow Corning objected to the mandatory release strongly suggests that they
did not believe that they were being paid in full.
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market value for the rights that they waived. 21 9 To the extent that the
value received by the waiving creditors is less than reasonably
equivalent value, then such waiver would be a fraudulent transfer to
the nondebtors if the consenting creditors were insolvent. More im-
portantly, there is a question whether the process of obtaining con-
sent provides meaningful bargaining for the waiving creditors. If the
"voluntary" waiver of rights is in fact not voluntary, plans providing for
such waiver also violate the Non-Expropriation Principle. 220
219 The value of such rights would approximately equal the present value of the
recovery from the nondebtors, taking into consideration such factors as probability of
a favorable recovery, the costs of obtaining recovery, and the possibility that the
nondebtors would become insolvent and be unable to pay any final recovery in full.
220 The bankruptcy case of Conseco, Inc. provides an example of how creditors
may be deemed to have given consent. Conseco, Inc., was a holding company for two
operating businesses-finance and insurance. Because of significant losses by its sub-
sidiaries in the finance business and other reasons, Conseco, Inc. and certain of its
subsidiaries sought to reorganize pursuant to a Chapter 11. See Voluntary Petition, In
reConseco, Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ill.) (No. 02-49672) (doc. no. I filed Dec. 17, 2002). In
its first five reorganization plans, the debtor proposed a release of nondebtor obli-
gors, including officers and directors, by each holder of a claim (1) who had accepted
the plan or (2) who received a distribution under the plan. See Debtor's Joint Plan of
Reorganization at art. 40 sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 989 filed Jan. 31, 2003);
Reorganizing Debtors' [First Amended] Joint Plan of Reorganization at art. 43-44
sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 2018 filed Mar. 12, 2003); Reorganizing Debtors'
Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at art. 45 sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc.
(doc. no. 2148 filed Mar. 18, 2003); Reorganizing Debtors' Third AmendedJoint Plan
of Reorganization at 8 para. 71, 47 sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 3988 filed June
16, 2003); Reorganizing Debtors' Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at 8
para. 72, 47 sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 4797 filed July 15, 2003). The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the United States Trustee objected to the
nondebtor releases for several reasons, including lack of meaningful consent by credi-
tors. Specifically, they argued that receipt of a payment under the plan should not be
deemed to be consent. See Objection of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
Confirmation of Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at 6-7, In re Conseco,
Inc. (doc. no. 3257 filed May 14, 2003); Objection of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Confirmation of Debtors' Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganiza-
tion at 3-6, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 4850 filed July 11, 2003); Objection of the
United States Trustee to Reorganizing Debtors' Third Amended Joint Plan of Reor-
ganization at 2, 5, exh. A at 4, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 4608 filed July 9, 2003).
Eventually, the debtors filed a plan providing a creditor who had not voted to accept
the plan with a choice of accepting a distribution and still rejecting the release. See
Reorganizing Debtors' Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at 8 para. 73, 50
sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 5424 filed Aug. 18, 2003) (defining "Consenting
Parties" as collectively a holder of a claim who either voted to accept the plan (and
was a member of class who accepted the plan) or "who (a) receives a distribution of
property if the Plan is Confirmed, and (b) has not properly and timely submitted the
Opt Out Notice"); Reorganizing Debtors' Sixth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganiza-
tion at 8 para. 73, 50 sec. C, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 5828 filed Sept. 9, 2003)
[VOL- 79:2
ERIE DOCTRINE AND BANKRUPTCY
2. Temporary Stays of Actions Against Nondebtors
A more limited infringement of creditor rights against nondebtor
co-obligors is the temporary stay of enforcement actions against
nondebtor co-obligors. Section 1301 of the Code imposes a stay of
actions by a creditor of a Chapter 13 debtor against an individual
guarantor of a consumer debt.221 In addition, courts have often tem-
porarily enjoined creditors from pursuing claims against
nondebtors. 222 Professor Brubaker has remarked that such temporary
injunctions have long been considered within the jurisdiction of bank-
ruptcy courts. 223
These temporary stays do expropriate the property rights of the
stayed creditors. Accordingly, they can only be justified under the
Non-Interference Principle. 224 For example, § 1301 may be ajustifia-
ble means to prevent a creditor owed a consumer debt from intimidat-
ing the debtor from filing a Chapter 13 proceeding because of a
creditor's threat against an individual family member who guaranteed
the consumer debt.225 Similarly, a temporary nondebtor stay may be
justified to prevent the dissipation of property of the estate, as in the
case of a fixed amount of insurance proceeds owed to the bankruptcy
estate that may be diminished by payments to creditors who have an
independent claim against the insurance company and therefore di-
rect access to such proceeds. 226
(same). The court approved the plan. See Order Confirming Reorganizing Debtors'
Sixth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, In re Conseco, Inc. (doc. no. 5840 filed
Sept. 9, 2003).
221 See 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
222 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 302 (1995) (holding that a
U.S. district court was bound by an injunction issued by a bankruptcy court prohibit-
ing creditors from collecting from sureties on a supersedeas bond).
223 See Brubaker, supra note 201, at 968, 1055-58 (discussing the jurisdictional
foundation for temporary nondebtor stays); Brubaker, supra note 199, at 33-39
(same).
224 I previously thought that the fact that both the creditor and the third party
nondebtor were creditors provided sufficient justification under the Bankruptcy
Clause. See Plank, supra note 167, at 568-69 (justifying co-obligor stays as adjusting
the relationship of one creditor against another as a part of the subject of bank-
ruptcy). My earlier analysis did not distinguish between preferring one creditor over
another in sharing in the debtor's assets-well within the scope of the Bankruptcy
Power-and abrogating one creditor's independent rights against another creditor-
outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Power-except to the extentjustified by the Non-
Interference Principle.
225 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 123 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6084 (describing the purpose of this section).
226 Several bankruptcy courts have enjoined creditor actions against the debtor's
insurers on the grounds that the insurance policies were property of the estate. See,
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Nevertheless, the standard for justifying these temporary
nondebtor stays should not be a loose one based on what will aid in
the reorganization effort of the debtor.227 The court must apply a
stricter standard complying with the Non-Interference Principle. The
court may stay an action by the creditor against the nondebtor that
would impede the debtor's ability to invoke the bankruptcy process or
hinder the trustee's ability to gather or protect the bankruptcy estate,
or to use its avoidance powers to enhance the estate.
V. APPLYING ERIE IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Difficulties of the Erie Doctrine
Applying Erie in federal diversity cases has not been without its
difficulties. These difficulties include (1) determining the sources of
state law and even the methodology for finding the state law; (2) de-
ciding the extent to which federal courts are bound by state procedu-
ral rules; and (3) in a case involving the law of more than one state,
e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 91-93 (2nd Cir. 1988) (af-
firming a bankruptcy court order enjoining suits by creditors against the debtor's
insurers entered as part of a settlement agreement between the debtor and the insur-
ers on the grounds that the proceeds of the policies were property of the estate); A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001-03, 1008 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
district court had the authority to enter a preliminary injunction against creditors
suing the debtor's insurer because the insurance was property of the estate); In re
Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the bankruptcy court had
the authority to enjoin creditors' direct action under Louisiana law against debtor's
insurers because the insurance was property of the estate). On the other hand, the
bankruptcy court in In re Celotex Corp., 128 B.R. 478 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991), incor-
rectly held that a supersedeas bond issued by an insurance company to enable the
debtor to appeal a pre-petition judgment and secured by property of the debtor was
itself property of the estate justifying an injunction preventing a judgment creditor
from collecting on the supersedeas bond. See id. at 480-83; see also Edwards v. Arm-
strong World Indus., 6 F.3d 312, 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds by
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1993) (holding, in an appeal from a collat-
eral attack on the bankruptcy court's injunction, that the supersedeas bond was not
property of the estate). Of course, by the very terms of a supersedeas bond issued for
appellate proceedings that had not been completed, a creditor could not collect on
the bond if completion of the appellate proceedings were automatically stayed by the
filing of a petition. The bankruptcy court did not, however, rely on this rationale, and
for at least one of the supersedeas bonds, the appellate proceedings had been com-
pleted before the debtor filed its petition. See Celotex, 514 U.S. at 301-02, 313 (hold-
ing that, regardless of the merits of the bankruptcy court's injunction, the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and the creditor could not collaterally
attack the bankruptcy court's decision by proceedings in another federal court).
227 See, e.g., Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132 (1949); see also supra note 172 and
accompanying text.
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choosing which state's law should apply. These difficulties also apply
in bankruptcy, but because of the differences between a diversity case
and a bankruptcy case, the resolution of the issues may differ.
Federal courts use a variety of methods in determining the con-
tent of state law. Of course, if a state statute is on point, the determi-
nation of state law is usually easy. If there is a decision of the state's
highest court on point, the determination of state law may also be
relatively simple. On the other hand, if the decision is not of recent
origin, and developments in the law elsewhere suggest that the state's
highest court may rethink its current precedent, the federal court
faces a dilemma. Should it adhere to the existing case law-the static
approach-or should it attempt to discern what the highest court
would decide today?228 Further, what should a federal court do if the
only relevant case law is that of a lower court or if there is no relevant
case law? In these cases, federal courts often attempt to predict what
the highest court would rule. 229 One solution to these problems is the
certification by the federal court of state law questions to the state's
highest court.230 When a federal court in bankruptcy must resolve a
discrete state law issue, it faces the same problems as other federal
courts.
As to the issues of how the substance-procedure dichotomy or the
choice of law conundrum affects the application of Erie in bankruptcy,
an exposition of these issues deserves a fuller treatment that is beyond
the scope of this Article. I will simply make a few observations.
Bankruptcy law has its own procedure that is unique in many
ways. This procedure is designed to foster the bankruptcy goal of effi-
cient administration of bankruptcy cases involving insolvent debtors.
The procedures necessarily differ from state court procedures. Never-
theless, federal courts in bankruptcy may not fashion procedural rules
that have the effect of violating the limits on Congress's Bankruptcy
Power.
Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue231 illustrates the point. In
Raleigh, the State of Illinois presented a claim in the bankruptcy case
228 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 39 passim (describing the static approach and the
predictive approach and arguing that the federal courts should employ a presump-
tion in favor of certifying unresolved issues to state courts).
229 See generally 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4507, at 115-85 (describing
federal courts' methods of and difficulties in determining the content of state law).
230 Id. § 4507, at 169-85 (describing the certification process and the difficulties
arising from its use); Clark, supra note 39, at 1544-49 (describing the availability of
certification as of the late 1990s, in which some form of certification was available in
more than forty states).
231 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
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of the debtor based on a notice of tax liability. 232 Under Illinois law,
the tax payer-the debtor in Raleigh-had the burden of proving that
the tax liability was incorrect or invalid.233 The bankruptcy court,
however, held that despite state law, Illinois had the burden of prov-
ing its tax claim in the bankruptcy case.2 34 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that a bankruptcy court was not free to alter the
burden of proof.23 5
As the Court noted in Raleigh, the burden of proof in this context
is considered a matter of substance, not procedure. 236 As noted
above,237 the Court's holding is consistent with a separation of powers
understanding of Erie. Congress, however, is free to reduce the rights
of creditors under the Bankruptcy Power, and it could choose to
change the burden of proof. Therefore, a federal bankruptcy com-
mon law rule that altered the burden of proof for creditors would not
violate the primary Erie doctrine.
On the other hand, a bankruptcy court could not alter the bur-
den of proof of a claim held by a debtor against a third party. If the
bankruptcy estate of a debtor included a contract right against a third
party, and state law imposed the burden of proof on the trustee in
bankruptcy to establish all of the elements necessary to enforce that
right, neither Congress nor a federal court in bankruptcy could alter
that state law allocation of the burden of proof. Similarly, federal
courts in bankruptcy must follow other state rules of "procedure" that
go to the substance of a third party's rights.
This analysis applies equally to choice of law. Under Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,238 a federal court should apply the
choice of law rule of the state in which the federal court is sitting.239
232 Id. at 18.
233 Id.
234 In re Stoecker, 202 B.R. 429, 437 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), revd, 179 F.3d 546
(7th Cir. 1999), afJ'd sub nom. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
235 Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 24-25 ("Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name
of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of
creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides.").
236 Id. at 15. For certain purposes, the burden of proof may be considered proce-
dural. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 762 (1st Cir. 1940) (holding that a
Massachusetts federal court in a diversity case must apply the Massachusetts law on the
allocation of the burden of proving contributory negligence, which the Massachusetts
courts describe as a matter of procedure, and noting that federal and state courts
have upheld statutes retroactively changing the burden of proving contributory negli-
gence on the grounds that such statutes are procedural and not substantive).
237 See supra Part I.C.
238 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
239 See id. at 496.
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Some would say that this rule is problematic. 240 In bankruptcy, there
is a further complication. 241 A bankruptcy case may be filed in a fed-
eral district in which no diversity case involving the debtor or creditors
could be filed. In any event, the choice of law rule that is to be ap-
plied may not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle. Hence, a
choice of law rule may not be applied in a way that gives a debtor or
the creditors greater rights against a third party than what the debtor
or creditors would have outside of bankruptcy. 242
The distinct nature of a bankruptcy case presents additional chal-
lenges for applying Erie. Although many questions of state law
presented in bankruptcy cases also occur in state court proceedings,
bankruptcy cases generate some important issues for which there are
no state court analogues. The most significant of these are whether a
debtor has an interest in property and when a claim arises. The next
two sections discuss how federal courts in bankruptcy should apply the
primary Erie doctrine in resolving these issues.
B. Property-State, Not Federal Law
A bankruptcy case administers all of the interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case. These interests consti-
tute the property of the estate. 243 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, a bank-
ruptcy trustee will liquidate the property of the estate and distribute
the proceeds pro rata to the unsecured creditors. The theoretical
240 See Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS
L.J. 21 (1998).
241 See generally John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L.
REV. 531 (1989) (analyzing the application of choice of law rules in bankruptcy cases
and arguing that a bankruptcy court should select the law of the state whose court
would have heard the dispute if there had been no bankruptcy case).
242 Id. at 534, 576-78 (stating that the resolution of the forum choice of law issue
in bankruptcy should mirror the result that a nonbankruptcy court would meet); see
also Conflict of Laws in Bankruptcy: Choosing Applicable State Law and the Appropriate (State
or Federal?) Choice-of-Law Rule, BANKR. L. LETTER, July 2001, at 1 (discussing Bianco v.
Erkins (In re Gaston & Snow), 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001)). In Bianco, the bankruptcy
court sitting in New York applied the six-year New York law on the statute of limita-
tions to enable a debtor to collect a debt owed by an obligor located in Idaho that
would have been barred by the Idaho statute of limitations even though under
nonbankruptcy law, New York law would never have applied to recover. Professor
Ralph Brubaker, the contributing editor of Bankruptcy Law Letter, rightly criticized this
decision and argued that the court should have applied a federal choice of law rule to
prevent the forum shopping that the application of Klaxon in bankruptcy permitted.
Id. at 5. I would characterize such a rule not as a federal choice of law rule but as the
correct state law rule.
243 See supra note 10 (defining property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1)
(2000)).
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goal of a Chapter 11 reorganization is the confirmation of a plan
under which the debtor could retain the property of the estate and
reorganize its affairs. 244 Determining the property of the estate-the
interest of the debtor in property-is fundamental in every bank-
ruptcy case.
State courts typically do not face what is an interest in property in
this context. More typically, the issue that a state court might face is
whether a particular interest is "property" subject to (1) a creditor's
judicial lien, (2) a form of taxation, (3) the state's laws on inheritance,
and (4) other discrete issues. 245 Accordingly, when a federal court in
bankruptcy must decide whether a particular thing or interest is an
"interest in property," it must answer that question by looking at the
fundamental elements of a property interest.
In many cases, this task is not difficult. A bankruptcy court does
not have difficulty determining that a debtor's fee simple ownership
interest in Blackacre or a leasehold interest in an automobile is an
"interest of the debtor in property." Other more esoteric interests,
however, have presented problems for federal courts in bankruptcy.
One example of an esoteric property interest is the renewal right
to season tickets for sports teams. In In re LD. Craig Service Cotp.,246
the bankruptcy court held that the debtor's right to renew season tick-
ets to the Pittsburgh Steelers home football games was an "interest in
property" under state law.247 Therefore, the renewal right was in-
cluded in the property of the estate of the debtor and could be sold by
the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.248
The court found that, though the season tickets were revocable, the
Pittsburgh Steelers automatically offered to the holders of season tick-
ets the right to purchase season tickets for the following season.249
More importantly, the court found that the club routinely allowed any
244 A significant number of Chapter 11 cases, however, represent orderly liquida-
dons by the debtor in possession. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Financial Characteristics of Business in Bankruptcy, 73 Am. BANKR. L.J. 499, 523-24, 566
(1999) (reporting that a large number of Chapter 11 filings may in fact be liquida-
tions); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002) (asserting that Chapter 11 is generally no longer used as a
means to effect traditional corporate reorganizations).
245 One exception is a determination of whether a particular thing or interest is
an interest in property for which the state must provide compensation in connection
with the condemnation of property for a public use. See infra note 256 and accompa-
nying text.
246 138 B.R. 490 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
247 Id. at 502.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 495-97.
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season ticket holder to transfer the holders' renewal right to another
person. 250 The renewal right itself had value because season tickets
represented approximately ninety-five percent of the available
seats. 25
1
Although the court did not expressly state its analysis in terms of
the nature of property interests, the facts that it relied upon demon-
strate that the right to renew tickets in this particular instance had all
of the attributes of a property interest. The season ticket holder had
an exclusive right to renew the season tickets; 2 52 the renewal right it-
self had value; and the renewal right was transferrable. 253
Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ap-
plying Arizona law in Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. Partnership (In re Har-
rell),254 held that the right to renew season tickets to the Phoenix Suns
home basketball games was not an interest in property that became
part of the bankruptcy estate. 255 The court in part relied upon Ari-
zona case law to the effect that an expectation of renewal of a lease
was not a property interest for which the lessee was entitled to receive
compensation when the leased premises were taken in a state con-
demnation proceeding.2 56 The court unfortunately did not present
an analysis of the attributes of renewal rights. For example, the court
did not say whether the renewal right could be transferred, or
whether the Phoenix Suns keep greater control over those rights. A
faithful application of Erie in this case requires a more thorough anal-
ysis of the attributes of the particular thing in question. 257
Abele exemplifies a too superficial analysis of state law precedents
to determine whether a debtor has an interest in property. On the
250 Id. at 496-97.
251 Id. at 493.
252 The holder's rights were subject to revocation by the club, and therefore the
club retained some control over those rights. Still, until the holder transferred the
right, the holder was the only one who had the right to renew. See id. at 493-97.
253 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAw § 1.03[B], at 4-6
(2000); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 41, § 1.1, at 2-3.
254 73 F.3d 218 (9th Cir. 1996).
255 Id. at 219.
256 Id. at 219 (citing State ex ret. Miller v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Ariz., 795 P.2d
221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)).
257 In re Liebman, 208 B.R. 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997), presented a fuller analysis in
holding that the right to renew season tickets to Chicago Bulls home games was not
an interest of the debtor in property. Id. at 39. In that case, in addition to the charac-
terization of the right to renew as a "license," the Chicago Bulls emphatically an-
nounced to their season ticket holders that season tickets were offered on a one-year
basis, that the Bulls reserved the right to review accounts each year before offering
renewal, and that the Bulls prohibited transfers of season tickets except in limited
circumstances. Id. at 40.
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other hand, other federal courts in bankruptcy rely too much on a
characterization of the issue of whether a particular thing or interest
is an interest in property as an issue of "federal" law. 258
The Supreme Court's pre-Erie decision of Chicago Board of Trade v.
Johnson259 can be interpreted as an erroneous reliance on a "federal"
question approach. The issue in that case was whether an individual's
membership on the Chicago Board of Trade was an interest in prop-
erty that could be included in the bankruptcy estate under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.260 Under the Act, the definition of property of the
estate consisted of a laundry list of ten specific types of property inter-
ests, the most general of which was "property... which prior to the
filing of the petition [the bankrupt] could by any means have trans-
ferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him."' 261 Under the rules of the Chicago Board of
Trade, an individual could become a member upon approval of ten
members of the Board of Directors, no disapproval by three or more
directors, and payment of a $25,000 fee. 262 A member could transfer
his membership so long as all assessments had been paid and there
were no outstanding claims against the member. 263 In this case, the
debtor, Henderson, was indebted to other members for $60,000, and
at the time of filing the membership was worth $10,500.264 The dis-
trict court had ruled that the membership was property of the estate
and could be sold free and clear of the creditors' claims. 265
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of the creditors that
the membership was not a property interest at all, but it held that the
membership as a property interest retained all of its inherent limita-
258 See, e.g., In re Gunder, 8 B.R. 390 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). In this case, the
bankruptcy court held that it was not bound by a state automobile titling statute that
provided that the owner of an automobile was the person noted on the title issued by
the state. Id. at 392. The court properly concluded that an automobile titled in the
father's name was property of the estate of the son and his wife, but failed to provide
any meaningful analysis. Id. The son and the wife had possession and use of the car,
had borrowed the money to purchase the car, and were paying the debt service on the
car. Id. at 392-93. At most, the father had bare legal title. See id. at 392. The son and
wife had the equitable ownership interest which became part of their bankruptcy es-
tate. See id. at 393.
259 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
260 Id. at 8.
261 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
262 See id. at 7.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 7-8.
265 Id. at 6.
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tions.266 Accordingly, it ruled that the bankruptcy trustee could not
transfer the membership unless all of the claims of the members were
satisfied in accordance with the Board's rule. 26 7
The Court's analysis of the nature of the membership is, unfortu-
nately, wanting. It noted several Supreme Court precedents holding
that similar memberships were property interests subject to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 268 The Court also rejected the argument that it was lim-
ited by the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court that membership in
the Board of Trade was not property subject to execution and levy to
satisfy a debt owed to a judgment debtor.26 9 Instead of an analysis of
whether the membership was "property" in a broader sense, the Court
simply relied upon the power of federal courts:
Congress derives its power to enact a bankrupt law from the Federal
Constitution, and the construction of it is a federal question. Of
course, where the bankrupt law deals with property rights which are
regulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will fol-
low the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a
policy requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state
decisions would give it, federal courts can not be concluded by
them.2 70
This is an ambiguous statement. On the one hand, it could be read to
imply that federal courts can determine whether something is a prop-
erty interest as a matter of federal law, notwithstanding state law. 27'
On the other hand, it could simply mean that a federal court in bank-
ruptcy is not bound by the conclusiveness of a narrow state court de-
termination of a related but different issue. This latter interpretation
is consistent with Erie and is the better one.
The state court had held that a membership on the Board of
Trade was not a property interest that could be levied upon by ajudg-
ment creditor. That a particular "thing" or interest is not subject to
execution and levy by ajudgment creditor under a creditor collection
statute is not at all conclusive of whether that "thing" or interest is an
interest in property. Indeed, before and after the enactment of bank-
ruptcy laws in England and America, many different types of property,
such as real estate, securities, and negotiable instruments, were not
266 Id. at 11.
267 Id. at 12-13.
268 See id. at 10-11.
269 Id. at 8-9.
270 Id. at 10.
271 This is how Vern Countryman interpreted the case. Countryman I, supra note
89, at 438; see also supra text accompanying note 118.
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subject to execution and levy by creditors. 272 Certainly, no one would
claim that real estate, securities, or negotiable instruments were not
"property."
Further, a thorough examination of the attributes of the mem-
bership in Chicago Board of Trade reveals that it is a property interest.
It had value, it gave Henderson the exclusive right to its benefits, and
it was transferable. Instead of distinguishing the Illinois case law on a
cryptic notion of federal supremacy, the Court could have and should
have distinguished the Illinois case law dealing with the rights ofjudg-
ment creditors under a creditor collection statute from the more fun-
damental question of.whether the particular set of rights constitutes a
property right. In any event, after Erie, whether rights created pursu-
ant to state law are an interest of the debtor in property is not a fed-
eral question. Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, 273 neither
Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause nor federal courts in bank-
272 For example, in eighteenth century England, creditors' remedies were limited
to the writ of fierifacias, which authorized the sheriff to seize the tangible goods of the
debtor and sell enough of them to pay the debt; the writ of levarifacias, which enabled
the sheriff to seize the personal property of the debtor and the rents from the
debtor's real property to satisfy the debt (but not the right to possess or cause the sale
of the debtor's lands); the writ of elegit, which allowed delivery of the goods to the
creditor at an appraised value in satisfaction of the debt and, if there remained a
deficiency, gave the creditor possession of one half of the debtor's lands until the
debt was repaid (but did not allow the creditor to force the sale of the debtor's lands);
or the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, which imprisoned the debtor until the debt was
paid. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *414, *417-19. Imprisonment for
debt, an important creditor collection device in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, reflected a common belief that the refusal to pay debts was willful and .that
imprisonment provided an incentive for debtors who owned property which could
not be reached by the legal process of the day to pay their debts. See generally PETERJ.
COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT,
AND BANKRuvrcv, 1607-1900 (1974);Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and
its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIsT. 153, 155
(1982). Indeed, debtors of substance sometimes preferred imprisonment, because
once the body of the person was taken in execution on the writ, no other writ could
be issued against his or her goods or lands. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *415. Also, credi-
tors used imprisonment because they could not force the sale of either the debtor's
lands or negotiable instruments (and certain other intangible property). See Cohen,
supra, at 154-55; Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
283, 285 (1980); Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bank-
ruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 195 n.21 (1938). The intangible property that was
not subject to execution and levy included annuities, bank notes, bonds, book debts,
negotiable instruments, and stocks and shares in public funds. See Duffy, supra, at
285. In America, a few states continued the prohibition against the seizure and exe-
cution sale of land for the satisfaction of debts. See COLEMAN, supra, at 191-92 (dis-
cussing colonial Virginia law).
273 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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ruptcy under the primary Erie doctrine have the power to make a
"thing"-such as my right to vote-a property interest that can be dis-
tributed to creditors if that "thing" is not a property interest under
state law.
C. Creditors, Claims, and State vs. Federal Law
The purpose of a bankruptcy case is to provide an efficient
method of repaying the creditors of a insolvent debtor. Thus, the de-
termination of who are the creditors is an essential part of any bank-
ruptcy case. A creditor has standing to participate in the case. In a
liquidation, a creditor will receive a pro rata share of the debtor's as-
sets. 2 74 In a reorganization, the creditor will receive repayment pursu-
ant to a reorganization plan upon which the creditor may vote.
Unless it otherwise agrees, the creditor must receive under a reorgani-
zation plan at least what it would have received in a liquidation.
275
Also, a creditor's claim will be discharged in either a liquidation 276 or
a reorganization. 277 A creditor is an entity who has a claim-a right to
payment-that arises before the "order for relief."2 78 In almost all in-
stances, a creditor is a person whose claim arose before the filing of
the petition, because a voluntary petition in bankruptcy constitutes an
"order for relief."279 If a claim arises after the order for relief, the
274 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2000) (providing for distribution of property of the estate
to creditors).
275 Id. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (providing that one of the requirements for court ap-
proval of a reorganization plan is either that the holder of a claim has accepted the
plan or would receive at least what it would receive in a liquidation).
276 Id. § 727 (providing when an individual may receive a discharge of debts in
Chapter 7). Debtors who are not individuals that liquidate under Chapter 7 do not
receive a discharge, id. § 727(a) (1), but do not need one. All the assets of the debtor
are used to pay expenses and creditors and the debtor remains an empty shell that
will eventually be dissolved under state law. In effect, a nonindividual debtor gets a de
facto discharge in a liquidation.
277 Id. § 1141(d) (providing that the effect of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan is to
discharge the debts of the debtor); see id. § 1228 (authorizing the discharge of debts
of a debtor in a Chapter 12 case upon completion of all payments required by a
confirmed plan); see also id. § 1328 (same, for debtor in a Chapter 13 case).
278 See supra note 11 (defining "creditor" and "claim").
279 See 11 U.S.C. § 301. The "order for relief" is different for an involuntary peti-
tion, that is, one filed by the creditors. Id. § 303(b). The court will enter an order for
relief after the filing of the involuntary petition unless the petition is contested, in
which case it will enter an order for relief only if the debtor is not generally paying its
debts as they come due, or a custodian of less than all the debtor's property was
appointed within 120 days before the filing of the petition. Id. § 303(h).
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claim may be an administrative expense entitled to payment in full
before creditor's claims.2 80
Finally, if the claim arises after the conclusion of the case, the
ability of the claimant to be paid depends on the type of bankruptcy
case. If the case is an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the
individual debtor will retain full liability for the post-bankruptcy claim
and the debtor's fresh start will not encompass the claim. Hence the
individual's future income will be available to satisfy the post-bank-
ruptcy claim. If the case is a Chapter 7 liquidation of a debtor who is
not an individual, the debtor will retain full liability for the post-bank-
ruptcy claim, but the debtor will be an empty shell that has no as-
sets.28 ' Hence, the claimant will not recover its claim. Finally, if the
case is a Chapter 11 reorganization, whether an individual or not,
then the debtor will retain full liability for the post-bankruptcy claim
and the debtor's future income will be available to satisfy the claim.
The simple claims present no problems. If a debtor borrows
money and then files for bankruptcy, the lender is a "creditor." If a
debtor injures another person in an automobile accident and then
files for bankruptcy, the victim is a "creditor." However, in the case of
torts involving latent injuries that do not become manifest until after
the act that caused the injury, the question of when a claim arises has
troubled many federal courts in bankruptcy.
To determine when a latent tort claim arises, federal courts in
bankruptcy have generally used three different tests: the conduct test,
the relationship test, and the state law accrual test.2 82 Under the con-
duct test, the claim of a victim arises at the time of the conduct that
causes injury.283 Under the relationship test, the claim arises at the
later of the time of the conduct or the time that the victim and the
280 Id. §§ 503(b) (1) (A), 507 (a) (1). Administrative expenses include tort claims
that arise after the order for relief. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 482-83
(1968) (holding that the bankruptcy estate of a debtor that attempted to reorganize
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 should bear the costs of damages
caused by the receiver's negligence because the Chapter XI case was attempted for
the benefit of the creditors, and therefore such damages should be treated as an
administrative expense).
281 See supra note 276.
282 See, e.g., Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate of Piper
Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1995); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as
a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2045,
2070-75 (2000) (identifying a fourth test-the "fair contemplation test"-and advo-
cating the adoption of a modified conduct test); see also NBRC REPORT, supra note 2,
§ 2.1.1, at 323; TABB, supra note 145, § 7.2, at 473-75.
283 See Epstein, 58 F.3d at 1577.
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tortfeasor enter into a relationship.2 8 4 Under the state law accrual
test, the claim arises when the cause of action "accrues" under various
state law provisions, most commonly when the victim discovers the in-
jury and the cause of action begins to accrue for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations. 28 5
I have previously expressed my view that Congress may adopt the
broadest definition of a claim and adopt the conduct test for when a
claim arises. 286 In my view, the conduct test-the broadest test-is the
proper state law test. The relationship test represents a federal bank-
ruptcy common law test. The state law accrual test is simply the "erro-
neous state law" test. I draw these distinctions because in my view,
under state law, a contingent tort claim arises at the time of the con-
duct. Some courts reject the conduct test and adopt the relationship
test on policy grounds. Those policy grounds-be they bankruptcy
policy or other constitutional policy concerns-may be appropri-
ate.2 8 7 The policy concerns do not negate the fact that the actors in
the real world for the most part treat any latent contingent tort as
having been created at the time of the conduct and that any type of
human activity-including manufacturing and selling products and
providing services-creates the possibility of a claim under state law
that will mature in the future.2 88 The conduct test recognizes and the
state law accrual test ignores this reality.
The state law accrual test, which has been rejected by most fed-
eral courts in bankruptcy, 289 reflects an erroneous reliance on a spe-
cific point of state law that has a different and much narrower
concern than when, under state law, a claim first comes into exis-
tence. It also presents a good example of how federal courts in bank-
ruptcy should not interpret and apply state law. A good-or should I
say bad-example of the reasoning that created this test is Avellino &
Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.).290 In this case, Avellino
& Bienes audited M. Frenville Co. and prepared certified financial
statements for the years 1978 and 1979.291 In August 1980, and Febru-
ary 1981, M. Frenville Co. and Rudolf Frenville became debtors in
bankruptcy. 29 2 Before the debtors filed their bankruptcy petitions,
284 See id.
285 See id. at 1576.
286 See Plank, supra note 9, at 1105-10.
287 Id. at 1108 & n.167.
288 Id. at 1107-08.
289 See, e.g., Epstein, 58 F.3d at 1576.
290 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1985).
291 Id. at 333.
292 Id.
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Chase Manhattan Bank and other banks had lent M. Frenville Co. a
substantial amount of money on an unsecured basis. After the bank-
ruptcy case had commenced, these banks sued Avellino & Bienes for
$5,000,000 alleging that the negligent and reckless preparation of
false financial statements caused the banks' loss. 293 Later, Avellino &
Bienes filed a complaint in bankruptcy court for relief from the auto-
matic stay of creditor suits under § 362(a) (1) of the Code.294 Specifi-
cally, Avellino & Bienes sought to join M. Frenville Co. and Rudolf
Frenville as third party defendants in the banks' suit to obtain indem-
nification and contribution from M. Frenville Co. and Rudolf
Frenville if the accounting firm were found liable to the banks. 29 5
The bankruptcy court found that the Avellino & Bienes suit
would violate the stay and refused to lift the stay.2 9 6 The district court
affirmed. 297 The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that under
§ 362(a) (1) of the Code, Avellino & Bienes' suit was not a proceeding
"to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case." 298 The court stated that, under state law, the
accounting firm's cause of action for indemnification and contribu-
tion from a third party could not have been commenced until the
accounting firm had been sued and had filed its answer. The court
applied this state rule to hold that the accounting firm's contingent
right to payment for indemnification and contribution did not arise
under bankruptcy law until it had been sued and had filed its
answer.
299
The court's analysis and application of state law in the bankruptcy
case is seriously flawed. It is just plain wrong to say that the account-
ing firm had no right to payment until it could file suit. The court
itself recognized that if the debtor had entered into a written indem-
nity agreement in favor of the accounting firm, then the firm would
have had a right to payment, although contingent, that arose at the
time of the execution of the indemnity agreement. 300 The court sim-
293 Id.
294 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1) (2000).
295 See Avelino & Bienes, 744 F.2d at 333-34.
296 Id. at 334.
297 Id.
298 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1)).
299 Id. at 335.
300 Id. at 336.
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ply declared that the accounting firm's common law right to payment
was different, without explaining how.3 11"
The court admirably stated that it had to follow state law. 30 2 Un-
fortunately, its analysis of applicable state law is wanting. In particu-
lar, the New York rule that limits the filing of actions for
indemnification serves a particular purpose: the efficient administra-
tion of the court system. That purpose is not relevant to the question
that was before the court. Every person who provides professional ser-
vices, such as a lawyer or accountant, knows or should know that there
is always a possibility of a suit against the professional. In some cases,
the professional will have a claim for indemnification or contribution
from the client. Assume that a professional serves 1000 clients and
that there is a probability that the representation of one of those cli-
ents will produce a suit by a third person and a claim for indemnifica-
tion from the client. The claim, though contingent, arises out of the
conduct of the client in the course of the professional's
representation.
From the perspective of managing a litigation system, it makes
sense that the professional need not file suit (and indeed may not file
suit) until the contingency occurs. But a rule designed to provide for
an efficient management of the state court system has nothing to do
with the question of when the claim first comes into existence. As
described above, conduct can produce a tort claim. The claim,
though contingent, first comes into existence at the time of the con-
duct. It may take time for the claim to mature, and no claim may
mature, but the contingent nature of when or whether the claim will
mature does not change the fact that the claim comes into existence
at the time of the conduct. Focusing on the irrelevant state law does
not serve either the requirements of the primary Erie doctrine or the
separation of powers aspect of Erie.
CONCLUSION
State law issues arise all the time in bankruptcy cases because the
Code itself depends heavily on state law either expressly or implicitly.
When resolving these state law issues, federal courts in bankruptcy
must respect the limits on Congress's power to alter state law entitle-
ments. Congress, and therefore federal courts in bankruptcy, may al-
ter the relationship between an insolvent debtor and his, her, or its
301 Id. The court also held that, under § 362(a) (1) of the Code, Avellino &
Bienes' suit was not a proceeding that could have been commenced before bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 233. This portion of the ruling was correct.
302 Id. at 337.
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creditors that is based on state law. However, neither Congress nor
federal courts may do more. They must respect the rights of third
parties who may be affected by a bankruptcy case. They may not cre-
ate property or contract rights that do not exist outside of bankruptcy.
They must respect the principles of federalism and the limits of Con-
gressional power expressed in the primary Erie doctrine.
To be sure, applying Erie in bankruptcy is challenging. Many of
the difficulties seen in applying Erie in diversity cases apply in bank-
ruptcy. Moreover, because of the significant differences between a
bankruptcy case and a diversity case, federal courts in bankruptcy may
face a more difficult time resolving some state law issues. Every bank-
ruptcy case presents two fundamental questions: (1) what property of
the debtor should be liquidated or reorganized for the benefit of
creditors, and (2) who are creditors who should participate in and be
bound by the bankruptcy case-that is, who has a claim that arises
before the bankruptcy case begins. These bankruptcy questions re-
quire the resolution of fundament state law issues.
States are free to vary the extent to which they will recognize
property interests, contract rights, and tort claims. In the absence of
deliberate variations, many of the property interests, contract rights,
and tort claims that exist under state law nevertheless have the same
essential elements. Respecting the primary Eie doctrine in resolving
the fundamental issues of state law that appear in bankruptcy cases
will lead to the development of a body of general state law. This body
will begin to resemble the early nineteenth century vision of a general
commercial law that found its expression in Swift v. Tyson. However,
consistent with Erie, which overruled Swift v. Tyson, this development
will not be a federal general common law, but rather an American
general common law.
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